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MOFFATT HANCOCK AND
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS:
AN AMERICAN-CANADIAN PERSPECTIVEt
1 Introduction: The contributions of Moffatt Hancock
to the conflict of laws
The illustrious career of Moffatt Hancock as a commentator on the
conflict of laws spans the stages of development of modern conflicts law in
the United States.' When Professor Hancock came from Canada to the
United States in 1949 - after having established himself as somewhat of a
'conflicts maverick' in his home country' - the American courts were still
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University
t A review of Studies in Modern Choice-of-Law: Torts, Insurance Land Titles by Moffatt
Hancock, Marion Rice Kirkwood Professor of Law Emeritus, Stanford Law School
(Buffalo: William S. Hein Company, 1984), pp xviii + 446, $45.00
I The stages of development of modern conflicts law in the United States may be
summarized as follows: I / in the 195os: adherence to the traditional approach with the
use of 'manipulative techniques' and the changing of rules in some cases to produce
functionally sound results; 2 / in the 96os: beginning with Babcock v. Jackson 12 N.Y. 2d
473, 191 N.E. 2d 279 (1963), the abandonment of the traditional approach, primarily
with respect to the place of the wrong rule in torts cases, by many courts; 3 / in the
197os: application of a policy-centred approach to the resolution of conflicts problems
by the great majority of American state courts and extensive debate over the 'preferred'
specific methodological approach to choice of law.
Throughout I will be using the term 'state' in the conflicts sense to refer to any
geographic portion of the earth's surface having an independent system of law. In a
federal system, such as the United States, each state of the Union, the territories, and
the District of Columbia are 'states' for conflicts purposes, and in Canada each province
and federal territory is a 'state' for conflicts purposes. Unitary systems, such as France
and Italy, are also 'states' for conflicts purposes.
In the United States the federal courts have jurisdiction to hear cases where the
parties reside in different states. In such cases, however, the federal courts must apply
the law of the state in which they sit on most matters arising in the litigation, including
conflicts questions. Klaxon v. StentorElectric Mfg Co., 313 U.S. 487 (194 1). Thus, a federal
court hearing a 'diversity' case is treated as if it were a court of the state in which it is
sitting.
2 In the introduction to this book, David F. Cavers, one of the most eminent American
conflicts authorities, makes the following observations about the publication of Moffatt
Hancock's book Torts in the Conflict of Laws in 1942: 'This volume, despite the
distractions of wartime, commanded a considerable degree of attention and a
distinguished array of reviewers whose appraisals were preponderably favorable. What
surprised its readers was that a Canadian author, then a member of the University of
Toronto law faculty, should not only deplore the first rule in the authoritative Phillips v.
Eyre [L.R. 6 Q.R. 1 (1870)] but should question the classification of "procedure" by the
"internal law of either the forum or the place of wrong," and doubt the exploratory
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following the traditional approach to choice of law. This approach was
based on the concept of 'legislative jurisdiction' and consisted of broad,
state-selecting rules designed to govern the choice of law decision within
specified categories of cases.3 Hancock became an important addition to
the ranks of the American conflicts scholars who were challenging the
soundness of the traditional approach and advocating in its stead an
approach to choice of law based on considerations of policy and fairness.
4
Unlike some of the earlier critics of the traditional approach, 5 Hancock
did not limit himself to exposing the theoretical inconsistencies and
functional unsoundness of the traditional approach. But, unlike some of
the other policy-oriented theorists, he did not try to develop a specific
and comprehensive methodology for the resolution of choice of law
problems either. 6 Rather his focus was on identifying the factors that
power of the vested rights theory. Moreover, Professor Hancock's avowed recognition
of the role of social policy in Conflict of Laws moved one startled reviewer to an
illuminating overstatement: "The main emphasis of the book is policy, policy, policy."'
MacIntyre, book review, 55 Harv. L. R. (1942) cited in introduction to Hancock Studies
in Modern Choice-of-Law: Torts, Insurance, Land Titles v (hereinafter Hancock).
3 See generally the discussion of the traditional approach to choice of law in the United
States in Sedler and Cramton The Sum and Substance of Conflict of Laws (2d ed. 198 1)
ch. 4.
4 Such an approach may be referred to generically as a policy-centred approach to choice
of law. This approach rejects a priori rules that are to be applied to all cases within a
particular category. Rather it looks to the fact-law pattern presented in the particular
case and makes the choice of law decision in the light of the relevant social and
economic policies found in the laws of the involved states and considerations of fairness
to the parties. It embraces a number of specific methodological approaches to choice of
law, all of which have as their basis considerations of policy and fairness. See
generally the discussion of the policy-centred approach, especially as distinguished
from a rules approach, in Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky: Judicial method
and the policy-centred conflict of laws (1967) 56 Ky L.J. 27, at 57-63.
5 It has been said that earlier critics of the traditional approach, such as Walter Wheeler
Cook (see, e.g., Cook, The logical and legal bases of the conflict of laws (1924) 33 Yale
L.J. 457), Hessel Yntema (see e.g., Yntema, The Hornbook method and the conflict of
laws (1928) 37 Yale L.J. 468), and Ernest Lorenzen (see e.g., Lorenzen, Territoriality,
public policy and the conflict of laws (1924) 33 Yale L.J. 736), 'spent their entire careers
attacking the Restatement' (the traditional approach was embodied in the original
Restatement of Conflict of Laws, published in 1934) and were not able to offer a
comprehensive approach in its stead. See Ehrenzweig, The Second Conflicts Restate-
ment: A last appeal for its withdrawal (1965) 113 U. Pa. L.Rv. 123o, at 1231.
6 The most influential specific methodological approach to choice of law has been the
interest analysis approach, developed by the late Brainerd Currie. See generally Currie
Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (1963). Other important specific methodological
approaches include Robert A. Leflar's 'choice influencing considerations' (see Leflar,
Choice-influencing considerations in conflicts law (1966) 41 N.Y.U.L.R. 267, More on
choice influencing considerations (1966) 54 Cal. L.R. 1584) and David F. Cavers'
'principles of preference.' See Cavers The Choice of Law Process (1965). These specific
methodological approaches all fall within what I have referred to generically as a
policy-centred approach. Some modern commentators also advocate the adoption of
'narrow policy-based rules.' See Reese, Choice of law: Rules or approach (1972) 57
64 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL
should influence the choice of law decision in particular contexts, on
demonstrating why no single factor should ever be dispositive of the
choice of law decision, 7 and on developing a sound analytical framework
for the resolution of choice of law problems on the basis of considerations
of policy and fairness.
What may be called the 'middle stage' of Hancock's career - the early
I96os - coincided with the modern choice of law revolution in the United
States, which saw the great majority of American state courts abandoning
the traditional approach in favour of what may be referred to generically
as a policy-centred approach to choice of law.8 While these courts
purportedly employ different and sometimes an amalgam of specific
methodological approaches to choice of law, 9 it can be demonstrated that
in practice the courts are actually following the interest analysis approach,
as developed by the late Brainerd Currie and refined by his followers."°
Or, to put it another way, the results reached in practice by the courts that
have abandoned the traditional approach are generally consistent with
Currie's interest analysis approach irrespective of what specific method-
Cornell L.R. 315; Rosenberg, Two views on Kell v. Henderson (1967) 67 Col. L.R. 459;
Korn, The choice-of-law revolution: A critique (1983) 83 Col. L.R. 772. The Restatement
of Conflict of Laws Second, promulgated in 1972, combines presumptive state-selecting
rules, based on the concept of the 'state of the most significant relationship,' with policy
analysis. In practice, the application of the Restatement Second's approach by the courts is
usually in terms of policy analysis.
7 Such as the place where the harm occurred in tort cases, as was required under the
place of the wrong rule of the traditional approach, or the situs of the land with respect
to any question involving immovablts, as was required by the situs rule of the
traditional approach.
8 The choice oflaw revolution began with the decision of the New York Court of Appeals
in Babcock v.Jackson, supra note s, in 1963. Twenty years later, my count indicated that
of the fifty states and the District of Columbia, thirty-one had adopted a modern
approach to choice of law, at least in torts cases, sixteen states continued to adhere to the
traditional approach, and two states had not directly addressed the issue. Sedler,
Interest analysis and forum preference in the conflict of laws: A response to the 'new
critics' (1983) 34 Merc. L.R. 593-4, n. 1.
9 Leflar has observed on this score: 'Most of the current cases follow a pattern of multiple
citation, seldom relying solely upon any single modern choice-of-law theory, but
combining two or more of the theories to produce results which, interestingly, can be
sustained under any or nearly all of the new non-mechanical approaches to conflicts
law.' Leflar, Choice of law: A well-watered plateau (1977) 41 Law & Contemp. Prob. so, at
10.
1o For my reformulation of Currie's interest analysis, see Sedler, The governmental
interest approach to choice of law: An analysis and a reformulation (1977) 25
U.C.L.A.L.R. 181, at 220-43. See also Kay, The use of comparative impairment to
resolve true conflicts: An evaluation of the California experience (s98o) 68 Cal. L.R.
577. Kay has also recently published a review essay of Hancock's book, relating
Hancock's views to the current criticisms of interest analysis as a basic approach to
choice of law. Kay, Review essay: Testing the modern critics against Moffatt Hancock's
choice of law theories (1985) 73 Cal. L.R. 525.
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ological approach the courts are purportedly following." It can also be
demonstrated that, at least in the torts area, the results that the courts
reach in practice in cases presenting the same fact-law pattern'" are fairly
uniform and can be expressed in terms of 'rules of choice of law." 3
Almost from the beginning of the modern choice of law revolution in
the United States, there has been extensive debate among academic
commentators as to which specific methodological approach is the
'preferred' approach to choice of law.' 4 That debate is now at a record
level of intensity. Much of the debate has centred around the soundness
of Currie's interest analysis approach,' 5 which is not surprising, since, as
Professor Herma Hill Kay has recently observed, 'Currie's work was at the
cutting edge of the choice of law revolution that swept classroom and
courtroom alike in the wake of the destruction of the traditional
approach.
' 6
Hancock did not directly join in this debate over the 'preferred'
i 1 See the discussion of this point in Sedler, supra note io, at 227-33. See also Sedler,
Reflections on conflict-of-laws methodology: A dialogue (1981) 32 Hastings L.J. 1628, at
1629, n. i and the works cited therein.
12 The term 'fact-law pattern' refers to the relevant factual contacts of the involved states
and the differences between the applicable laws. In the torts area, the fact part of the
fact-law pattern includes the states where the parties reside, the state where the harm
occurred, and if it differs, the state where the act or omission causing the harm took
place.
13 On this point see generally Sedler, Rules of choice of law versus choice-of-law rules:
Judicial method in conflicts torts cases (1977) 44 Tenn. L.R. 975. The most 'universal'
rule of choice of law, followed by all the states that have abandoned the traditional
approach, is that where two residents of the forum are involved in an accident in
another state, the law of the forum applies. Ibid. 1033-4. Where the courts have
differed on the result in particular fact-law patterns, the differences are sufficiencly
clear to indicate 'majority' and 'minority' views. For example, when two parties from a
non-recovery state are involved in an accident in a recovery state and suit is brought in
the recovery state, the courts are divided, with the majority view being that the forum
should apply its own law allowing recovery. Ibid. 1035.
14 Much of the debate is contained in law review symposia, built around some of the
leading conflicts cases. See e.g., symposium on Babcock v.Jackson, supra note i, in (1963)
63 Col. L.R. 1212; symposium on Reich v. Purcell 67 Cal.2d 551, 432 P.2d 727 (1967) in
(1968) 15 U.C.L.A.L.R. 551; symposium on Cipolla v. Shaposka 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d
854 (1970) in (197 1) 9 Duq. L.R. 347; symposium on Fosterv. Leggett 484 s.w.2d 827 (Ky.
1972) in (1973) 61 Ky L.J. 368; symposium on Neumeier v. Kuehner 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286
N.E.2d 454 (1972) in (1973) 1 Hofstra L.R. 93. Other major symposia reflecting the
debate over the preferred approach to choice of law in the United States include
Contemporary perspectives in conflict of laws (essays in Honor of David F. Cavers
(1977) 41 Law & Contemp. Prob. i; symposium, Conflict of laws, part 1 (1983) 34 Mer.
L.R. 471; symposium, Conflict of laws, part 11 (1984) 34 Merc. L.R. 419.
15 See particularly Brilmayer, Interest analysis and legislative intent (1980) 78 Mich. L.R.
392; Brilmayer, Methods and objectives in the conflict of laws (1984) 35 Merc. L.R. 555;
Ely, Choice of law and the state's interest in protecting its own (198 1) 23 W. & Mary L.R.
173; Korn supra note 6.
16 Kay, Review essay, supra note 1o, 534
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approach to choice of law, since his primary concern was not with
developing a specific methodological approach for the resolution of all
choice of law issues but with developing a sound analytical framework for
resolving choice of law questions in particular contexts on the basis of
considerations of policy and fairness. However, he is in agreement with
the basic premise of Currie's interest analysis approach, that the starting
point for choice of law analysis should be a consideration of the policies
reflected in the laws of the involved states and the interest of each state, in
the light of those policies, in having its law applied to the factual situation
presented in a particular case. He and Currie, although working
independently, were on parallel tracks as regards this starting point for
choice of law analysis. ' 7 He referred to this consideration of policies and
interests as the 'functional approach" 8 and constantly emphasized, as did
Currie,' 9 that such consideration of policies and interests in the conflicts
case was no different from the process of statutory construction and
interpretation in the domestic case, when the courts had to decide on the
reach of a statute in a case not clearly coming within its terms.2"
Hancock saw interest analysis or the 'functional approach' 2 ' as having
its efficacy in what Currie called the 'false conflict' situation, the case in
which only one of the involved states had a real interest"2 in having its law
applied in order to implement the policy reflected in that law. In such a
case23 Hancock, like Currie, contends that the application of the law of the
17 Cavers notes this point in the introduction. Hancock at v-vi. See also the discussion of
this point in Kay, Review essay, supra note 1o, 534-5. The dedication of Hancock's
book includes 'to the memory of our friend Brainerd Currie.'
18 See generally Hancock, ch. 1.
19 See, e.g., Currie, supra note 6, 627, 727-8.
2o This emphasis appears throughout the book, and some of the essays have 'statutory
construction' in their titles.
21 The term 'functional approach' has been used by other commentators to describe their
specific methodological approaches to choice of law. See Weintraub Commentary on the
Conflict of Laws (2d ed. ig8o); Von Mehren and Trautman The Law ofMultistate Problems
(1965).
22 A state has a real interest in having its law applied in order to implement the policy
reflected in that law when that policy will be significantly advanced by its application to
the particular situation containing a foreign element. See the discussion in Sedler,
supra note io, 222-7.
23 To illustrate this point, Hancock uses the case of Williams v. Pope Mfg Co. 52 La. Ann.
1417, 27 So. 851 (1go). There a married woman domiciled in Mississippi brought a
tort action in her own name in a Louisiana court to recover damages for a false
imprisonment occurring in Louisiana. She could bring suit in her own name under
Mississippi law but not under Louisiana law, since under Louisiana law her cause of
action was considered community property. As Hancock demonstrates, the policy
reflected in Mississippi law was directed towards Mississippi domiciliaries, while the
policy reflected in Louisiana law was directed toward Louisiana domiciliaries, so that
only Mississippi had a real interest in having its law applied on this issue in the case
before the court. Hancock 3-8.
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only interested state produces a functionally sound result, while the
application of the law of the state that does not have a real interest in
preference to the law of the state that does - as was so often required
under the state-selecting rules of the traditional approach 4 - produces a
functionally unsound result. There is substantial agreement among
academic commentators today that in the case of the false conflict 5 the law
of the only interested state should apply.2
6
Once the false conflict is passed, however, Hancock looks for solutions
that depart from those advocated under Currie's interest analysis ap-
proach. In the case of the true conflict - that is, the situation where both
the involved states have a real interest in having their law apply in order to
implement the policy reflected in that law - Currie maintains that the
forum should apply its own law to advance its own policy and interest.2 7
Hancock, by contrast, advocates techniques of reconciliation, 8 derived
from a searching examination of the policy reflected in a rule of
substantive law, including the strength with which the policy is held and
the present-day soundness of that policy.2 9 He likewise advocates such
24 For example, since liability for tort was governed by the law of the place of the wrong,
where two parties from a recovery state were involved in an accident in a non-recovery
state, the law of the non-recovery state would be applied. However, the state, based
solely on the fact that the accident occurred there, would have no interest in applying its
law to enable a non-resident defendant to avoid liability to a non-resident plaintiff. The
parties' home state, where the consequences of the accident and of allowing or denying
recovery would be felt, in contrast, would have a real interest in applying its law to
enable its resident plaintiff to recover. See the discussion of this situation in Hancock at
23-5.
25 It should be noted in this regard that there will not always be agreement over what is a
false conflict. There is, for example, substantial disagreement over whether the state
where an accident occurs has a real interest on that basis in applying its law to enable a
non-resident injured there to recover. If two parties from a non-recovery state are
involved in an accident in a recovery state, the parties' home state obviously has a real
interest in applying its law to deny recovery, and will do so if the suit is brought there.
See, e.g., Wartellv. Formusa 345 Ill.2d 57, 213 N.E. 2d 544 (1966); Fuerste v. Bemis 156
N.w.2d 831 (Iowa 1968). The plaintiff, however, can always sue in the state of injury,
obtaining jursidiction under the 'long-arm' act (the American equivalent of service ex
juris). If the state where the accident occurs does not see itself as having a real interest in
applying its law to enable a non-resident injured there to recover, it will treat the case as
a false conflict and apply the law of the parties' home state denying recovery. See, e.g.,
Vick v. Cochran, 316 So.2d 242 (Miss. 1975). but if it does see itself as having a real
interest in applying its own law, the case presents a true conflict, and that state will apply
its own law. See, e.g., Arnett v. Thompson 433 s.w. 2d 1o9 (Ky. 1968).
26 See the discussion of the false conflict in Sedler, The governmental interest approach,
supra note to, 186-7.
27 Currie, supra note 6, 107-8, 148-9, 182. I agree fully with Currie that the forum
should apply its own law in the true conflict situation (Sedler, supra note 10, 227-33)
and maintain that this is the result that generally obtains in practice. Ibid. 231-3.
28 The techniques of reconciliation are developed fully in ch. 4 and are applied further in
chs 5 and 6.
29 See the discussion infra 77-9.
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techniques of reconciliation in the 'unprovided-for case,' the situation
where neither of the involved states has a real interest in having its law
applied in order to implement the policy reflected in its law.3 ° Again,
Hancock's concern is with developing a sound analytical framework for
resolving choice of law questions in particular contexts rather than with
developing a specific methodological approach to choice of law.
Studies in Modern Choice-of-Law: Torts, Insurance, Land Titles contains
twelve essays published between 1961 and 1979 and a final essay
published in 1983. The essays included thus are those that coincide with
the modern choice of law revolution in the United States and so set forth
Hancock's views about choice of law during this contemporary period.3 '
The book can conveniently be divided into five parts.
The first two essays, 'Three approaches to the choice-of-law problem:
The classificatory, the functional and the result-selective,' published in
1961, and 'The rise and fall of Buckeye v. Buckeye: Marital immunity for
torts,' published in 1962, are in a sense foundational essays, discussing the
generically different approaches to choice of law32 and setting forth
Professor Hancock's advocacy of a policy-centred approach to choice of
law.
The next four essays, 'Anti-guest statutes and marital immunity for
torts in conflict of laws,' 'Anti-guest statutes: Realism in Wisconsin and
rule fetishism in New York,' 'Measure of damages for torts,' and 'The
effect in choice-of-law cases of the acquisition of a new domicile after the
commission of a tort or the making of a contract,' were published between
1973 and 1979 and discuss choice of law in practice, primarily in the torts
area, within the framework of the development of modern conflicts law in
the United States. Essays 7 and 8, 'Canadian-American torts in the conflict
of laws' and 'Torts choice-of-law problems resolved by statutory construc-
tion: The older English cases,' both published in 1968, reflect the
'Canadian component' of the book and compare the Anglo-Canadian
approach to choice of law in torts cases with the development of modern
conflicts law in the United States.
Essays 9 through 1 2, 'Choice-of-law problems resolved by statutory
construction: Charitable testamentary gift cases,' 'Equitable conversion
and the land taboo,' 'Full faith and credit to foreign laws and judgments in
30 See the discussion infra 81.
31 All Hancock's earlier works on the conflict of laws were published in Canadian journals.
It would have been desirable if a complete bibliography of his works had been
appended to the book
32 I consider the generically different approaches to choice of law to be a rules approach
and a policy-centred approach. See the discussion, infra 75-6. See also the discussion
of this point in Sedler, supra note 4, 60-3.
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real property litigation: The Supreme Court and the land taboo,' and
'Conceptual devices for avoiding the land taboo in the conflict of laws,'
were published between 1963 and 1967 and see Hancock applying a
policy analysis to property, conflicts questions, primarily those regarding
land. The final essay, 'The effect of a post-occurrence change of domicile
upon a choice of law determining the validity of other-insurance clauses
in an accident policy,' was published in 1983 and is based on the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague.3 3 In this
essay Hancock discusses both constitutional limitations on choice of law in
the United States and the significance of post-occurrence changes of
domicile in choice of law analysis.
The essays as a whole demonstrate the outstanding contributions of
Professor Hancock as a modern conflicts scholar. These essays are
eminently readable, and Hancock's views come across with clarity and
precision. The first part of this review will discuss and analyse his views on
choice of law, as reflected in these essays, and will demonstrate how they
have made an enduring contribution to the thinking about conflicts
problems in the United States. The second part will offer some observa-
tions, based on the 'Canadian component' of Hancock's essays, on the
possible influence of his views on the development of modern conflicts law
in Canada.
3 4
2 Hancock's views and the development of
modern conflicts law in the United States
The first essay in the book, 'Three approaches to the choice-of-law
problem: The classificatory, the functional and the result-selective,' is of
great personal interest to me, because it strongly influenced my own
thinking about the choice of law process. Its publication in 1961 coincided
with my teaching Conflict of Laws for the first time in what was my first
year of full-time law teaching. By luck I chanced upon the essay, and as I
read it, I understood very clearly why the traditional approach to choice
of law, or, as Hancock referred to it here, the classificatory approach, was
a fundamentally inadequate way to deal with conflicts problems and why,
if applied according to its terms, it would often lead to functionally
unsound results in actual cases.3 5 This was because, as Hancock demon-
33 449 u.s. 302 (ig81)
34 This discussion will take place with awareness of the inherent limitations in comment-
ing on a legal system other than one's own.
35 In my view, a result in a conflicts case is functionally unsound if it brings about the
application of the law of a state in circumstances in which the application of such law
would be considered to be objectively unreasonable. Where the policy reflected in the
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strates so cogently in this essay, '[t]he classificatory analysis does not
explicitly take into account the policies or purposes of domestic rules
which loom so large in the functional approach'36 and because, 'by reason
of their oversimplified, undiscriminating character, choice-of-law princi-
ples of the conventional type are a hopelessly inadequate set of verbal
tools for deciding, discussing or even thinking about choice-of-law
problems.'3 7 He also showed that to the extent that the application of the
traditional approach could sometimes produce functionally sound re-
sults, this was because 'the very breadth of the choice-of-law categories
sometimes permits alternative classifications so that the judge may
exercise a measure of choice within the framework of the classificatory
system.'3
8
What Hancock was saying in very restrained language was that the
traditional approach contained within it enough manipulative techniques
to enable a court willing to employ them to achieve what it considered to
be a functionally sound result in a particular case.3 9 Perhaps more than
any other commentator, Hancock showed how courts following the
traditional approach could and did use manipulative techniques to avoid
the functionally unsound results that would follow from the 'correct'
application of the rules of the traditional approach.40
But he also showed the dangers in the use of manipulative techniques to
achieve functionally sound results. As he points out in chapter io, when
discussing the use of the equitable conversion fiction as a manipulative
technique to avoid application of the situs rule to determine succession to
land,
[a]lthough courts have been able to reach satisfactory results by using the
law of one of the involved states would be advanced by its application in a particular case
containing a foreign element and the policy reflected in the law of the other involved
state would not be advanced by its application in that situation, to apply the law of the
latter state seems to me to be objectively unreasonable. See also the discussion of this




39 For further discussion of the use of manipulative techniques in practice, see Sedler,
supra note 4,48-53. For a discussion of the use of manipulative techniques in one state
to avoid the application of the place of the wrong rule in tort cases, see Sedler, Choice of
law in Michigan - A time to go modern (1978) 24 Wayne L.R. 829, at 839-47. When the
Michigan Supreme Court abandoned the place of the wrong rule a few years later, it
noted that '[t]he courts of Michigan have frequently departed from the lex loci in
individual instances' and concluded that as a result the principal argument in favour of
the place of the wrong rule - that it would provide certainty and predictability - 'in the
real world no longer is tenable.' Sexton v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. 413 Mich, 4o6, 425,
432; 320 N.w.2d 843, 85o, 854 (1982).
4o Examples of the use of manipulative techniques are found in most of the essays, and
essays so and 12 are built around the use of manipulative techniques in land cases.
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conversion doctrine to manipulate the situs formula, there are several risks
involved in this practice. One of these is that an insensitive judge, failing to
understand the evasive role of the conversion doctrine, may insist on dragging it
into a case where it produces an absurd result.4' Alternatively, such a judge may
naively permit some further manipulation of the conversion doctrine itself which
destroys its efficacy as an escape device.42 In either situation his misunderstanding
of the role of the conversion doctrine will probably have resulted from a basic
insensitivity to the policies of the domestic laws involved.
43
In other words, as Hancock shows, the game may be overplayed, or it may
not be played well enough.
44
Thus, his devastating criticism of the traditional approach concludes:
In some situations we find ourselves confronted by a set of elastic formulae which
can be manipulated to produce almost any result desired, so the clues to a
reasoned decision must be sought elsewhere. In other situations the conventional
choice-of-law principles seem to create an almost insurmountable barrier to an
otherwise sensible solution. In still other situations we find ourselves driven into a
41 He illustrates this situation by a discussion of a case where the court refused to fall into
this trap. In McCaughna v. Bihorn io Cal. Ap.2d 674, 52 P.2d 1025 (Cal. App., 4 th Dist.
1935), the testatrix, who died domiciled in Illinois, directed that her California land be
sold and the proceeds distributed. Her holographic will would be invalid under Illinois
law but valid under California law. However, an Illinois statute would have validated
the will had it been executed in California. Since the will concerned land situated in
California, Hancock contends that Illinois had not declared any policy antagonistic to
the enforcement of this will by a California court. This being so, the application of this
situs rule would produce a functionally sound result in this case, and Hancock applauds
the California court for rejecting the equitable conversion fiction and applying
California law. Hancock 316-318.
42 He illustrates this situation by a discussion of Norris v. Loyd 183 Iowa 1056, 168 N.W. 557
(1918), where the matter in issue involved inheritance by pretermitted children, so that
only the domicile would have a real interest in applying its law on this point. The situs
could have brought about the effective application of the law of the domicile by using
the equitable conversion fiction, since the will directed that the Iowa land be sold and
the proceeds divided among the testator's children. The beneficiaries, however, elected
to take the land, which theoretically worked a reconversion of the property. The Iowa
court held that this reconversion required the application of Iowa law as the law of the
situs, which Hancock considers to be an unsound result. Hancock 314-16.
43 Hancock 314
44 Moreover, the different levels of court may not be playing the same game at the same
time. In Toledo Society for Crippled Children v. Hickock 152 Tex. 578, 261 s.w.2d 692
(1953), for example, an Ohio domiciliary altered his will shortly before his death to
leave Texas land to an Ohio charity. This disposition violated Ohio's deathbed
disinheritance law but was valid under Texas law. Again, only Ohio had a real interest
in applying its law to determine whether the land went to the decedent's Ohio heirs or
to an Ohio charity. The lower courts in Texas used the equitable conversion fiction to
bring about the effective application of Ohio law on this issue, but the state supreme
court reversed, holding that the equitable conversion doctrine was inapplicable in the
choice of law context and applying Texas law as the law of the situs. See the discussion
of this case in Hancock at 225-38.
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kind of conceptual trap which prevents us from reaching a sound decision in one
case without committing ourselves to a wrong decision in another.4 5
A very valuable contribution of this essay is Hancock's distinction
between a functional approach and a result-selective approach, which,
although it was not fully appreciated in 1961, has turned out to be very
important subsequently. The functional approach, as he explains it,
involves 'explicit emphasis upon domestic laws and policies as basic
elements in the choice of law problem' and 'should enable commentators,
judges and counsel alike to think their way to particular conclusions with a
directness and conviction which, using the clumsy categories of choice of
law principles, it would have been impossible to obtain. '46 He said that the
methodology of the functional approach was that of 'statutory construc-
tion,' similar to determining the reach of a potentially applicable statute in
a domestic case. If the policy reflected in the rule of substantive law would
not be advanced by its application in the conflicts case, the law should not
be applied, just as it would not be applied in that circumstance in the
marginal domestic case.
47
The functional approach works well, he says, when the policy reflected
in the law of one of the involved states would be .advanced by its
application in the particular case but the policy reflected in the law of the
other involved state would not be so advanced.48 However, when the
policies reflected in the laws of both the involved states would be advanced
by their application to the particular case, he says that the problem of
which law should apply is not so easily resolved.4 9 In that circumstance he
contends that judges are very likely to be influenced, consciously or
unconsciously, by the same consideration which would guide their
judgment in the domestic analogue,' and they 'are likely to consider which
of the two competing rules will produce the most rational, convenient and
just decision in the litigation before them.'5 °
The difference between the functional approach and the result-
selective approach, then, is that the functional approach is based on a
consideration of the policies and interests of the involved states and makes
the choice of law decision depend on the extent to which each state's policy
would be advanced by its application in the particular case. The emphasis
45 Hancock 15
46 Ibid. 2. He notes here, 'The most vigorous advocate today of the importance of the
policies underlying domestic rules of law is Currie.'
47 Ibid. 4
48 Ibid. This is what Currie refers to as the 'false conflict.' See the discussion supra 66-7.
49 Ibid. 6-8. This is what Currie refers to as the 'true conflict.' See the discussion, supra
67.
50 Ibid 8
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is on policy and interest and not on the 'quality' of the differing laws, so to
speak. Under the result-selective approach, however, the 'quality' of the
differing laws becomes important, and the choice of law decision is likely
to be in favour of the 'better law.' 5 '
In this essay, Hancock himself did not come down in favour of either
the functional approach or the result-selective approach. It was not
necessary for him to do so at this time, since the courts in the United States
had not yet abandoned the traditional approach. Here he was trying to
explain what he considered to be the generically different approaches to
choice of law and to demonstrate the inadequacy of the traditional or
classificatory approach in comparison to the functional approach and the
result-selective approach.
The second essay is built around the 1959 decision of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co.,52 where that
court changed the rule as to the law governing questions of spousal
immunity. In the earlier case of Buckeye v. Buckeye, 53 that court, like all
other American state courts, had characterized the question of spousal
immunity as a question of 'tort,' to be determined by the law of the state
where the accident occurred. In Haumschild, where spouses from Wiscon-
sin, which did not recognize spousal immunity, were involved in an
accident in California, which did, the Wisconsin Supreme Court charac-
terized the question of spousal immunity as a question of 'family law,' to be
determined by the law of the marital domicile, which here not coinciden-
tally was Wisconsin. In so doing, the court introduced policy considera-
tions into the choice of law process, saying that the policy behind a rule of
spousal immunity was to protect marital harmony, so that the marital
domicile was the state primarily interested in having its law applied on this
issue. The court noted: 'We are convinced that, from both the standpoint
of public policy and logic, the proper solution of the conflict of laws
problem, in cases similar to the instant action, is to hold that the law of the
domicile is the one that ought to be applied in determining any issue of
incapacity to sue based upon family relationship.' 54 Thus, Buckeye was
overruled, and the court formulated a new choice of law rule: questions of
spousal immunity are characterized as questions of 'family law,' and the
applicable law is that of the marital domicile.
The situation presented in Haumschild and Buckeye is the classic false
conflict, where two parties from a liability state are involved in an accident
in a non-liability state. The parties' home state has a real interest in
51 Ibid. 15
52 7 Wis.2d 130, 95 N.w.2d 814 (1959)
53 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931)
54 7 Wis.2d at 137, 95 N.W.2d at 818
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applying its law to allow the injured plaintiff to recover, while the state
where the accident occurs has no interest at all in applying its law to enable
the out-of-state defendant to avoid liability. 55 Hancock uses this case to
explicate further his attack on the traditional approach. The only reason
that courts had held for so long that questions of spousal immunity were
determined by the law of the state where the accident occurred, he says, is
that they were 'led astray by the standard choice of law principles.'56 He
concludes: 'Because these concepts and principles took no account of the
policy thrust of domestic statutes and confronted the court with false
issues which effectively concealed them, thejudges ended up with a result
which has proven to be unsatisfactory.' 5 7
In retrospect, the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in Haumschild
represents a transitional step in the evolution from the traditional
approach to a modern, policy-centred approach to choice of law. As
Hancock demonstrates in this essay, courts following the traditional
approach, when faced with the situation of two forum residents involved
in an accident in another state, had frequently resorted to manipulative
techniques to bring about the effective application of the forum's law and
to achieve what the courts considered to be a functionally sound result.5 s
In Haumschild, however, the court did not try to 'manipulate the system.'
Rather it changed the characterization of the question and the resulting
choice of law rule, and it formulated the new rule, at least in part, with
reference to considerations of policy. This may be considered to be a
55 See the discussion in Hancock at 24-5.
56 Ibid. 30
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid. 34-8. He uses as an example Mertz v. Mertz 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936). In
that case spouses domiciled in New York, which at that time recognized spousal
immunity as a defence to tort liability, were involved in an accident in Connecticut,
which did not. When the injured spouse brought suit against the other spouse in New
York, the New York Court of Appeals was required by the place of the wrong rule to
look to the law of Connecticut where the accident occurred. The Court of Appeals held,
however, that to recognize the cause of action under Connecticut law would be against
New York's 'public policy.' For other examples of the use of manipulative techniques to
bring about the application of the forum's law where two forum residents were
involved in an accident in another state, see Levy v. Daniels U-Drive Auto Renting Co. o8
Conn. 333, 143 A. 163 (1928) (where a Connecticut driver rented a vehicle from a
Connecticut rental company in Connecticut and caused an accident injuring a
Connecticut victim in Massachusetts, the Connecticut court characterized the principal
question as one of 'contract,' so as to bring about the application of Connecticut law
imposing vicarious liability as the 'law of the place of contracting'); Grant v. McAuliffe 41
Cal.2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953) (where a California victim and a California driver were
involved in an accident in Arizona resulting in the death of the driver the California
court characterized the question of whether the cause of action survived the death of
the tortfeasor as one of 'procedure,' so as to bring about the application of California
law, under which the casue of action survived, as the law of the forum).
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transitional step towards the adoption of a policy-centred approach,
which occurred in Wisconsin a few years later.
59
Hancock also uses the Haumschild decision to demonstrate the differ-
ence between a classificatory or 'rules approach' to choice of law and a
policy-centred approach. What the court in Haumschild did was to change
the rule, and it based the change in the rule, at least in part, on
considerations of policy, but what emerged was still a rule, which, like any
rule, had to be applied to all cases coming within its terms. Dissatisfaction
with the broad, state-selecting rules of the traditional approach, which
was almost universal among academic commentators in the United States,
did not necessarily mean dissatisfaction with a rules approach generally to
the resolution of conflicts problems. The Restatement of Conflict of Laws
Second, as originally conceived, changed the rules of the traditional
approach, reflected in the first Restatement, but still embodied a rules
approach, looking to a plurality of factors and expressed in terms of the
'state of the most significant relationship.'c ° Other commentators have
advocated 'narrow, policy-based rules,' including a rule that questions of
spousal immunity should be determined by the law of the marital
domicile.6 '
The problem with rules, as Hancock emphasizes in this essay, is that
they require a 'package deal.' They go beyond the case that is before the
court and are designed to provide an a priori solution to a case that has not
yet arisen. 62 He illustrates this point in the spousal immunity context by
the example of the situation where two spouses from a spousal immunity
state are involved in an accident in Wisconsin. He has consistently main-
tained that the state where an accident occurs has a real interest in apply-
ing its law to allow a non-resident injured there to recover and should
apply its own law, even where both the plaintiff and the defendant are
from a non-recovery state. 63 While I strongly disagree with Hancock on
this score, 64 that is beside the point. Admittedly, the situation where two
parties from a recovery state are involved in an accident in a non-recovery
state is not, from a policy standpoint, identical to the situation where two
parties from a non-recovery state are involved in an accident in a recovery
state. In the former situation, the state of injury has no possible interest in
59 See Wilcox v. Wilcox 26 Wis.2d 617, 133 N.w.2d 408 (1965); Heath v. Zellmer 35 Wis.2d
578, 151 N.W.2d 664 (1967).
6o As to the approach of the Restatement Second and its operation in practice, see Sedler
and Cramton, supra note 3, ch. 5.
61 See, e.g., Reese, Choice of law: rules or approach (1972) 57 Cornell L.R. 315, at 327.
62 Hancock 52-3. On this point, see also the discussion in Sedler, supra note 10, 2 1o-16.
63 Hancock 64-5
64 See the discussion in SedlerJudicial method is 'alive and well': The Kentucky approach
to choice of law in interstate automobile accidents (1973) 61 Ky L.J. 378, at 382-3.
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applying its law to enable a non-resident defendant to avoid liability, while
in the latter situation the state of injury could at least plausibly assert an
interest in applying its law to allow recovery to a non-resident injured
there. But a rule to the effect that questions of spousal immunity are to be
determined by the law of the marital domicile is, as Hancock points out
here, a 'package deal,' requiring the same result in both situations without
any consideration of the possible interest of the state of injury in applying
its law allowing recovery in the second situation.
Thus, in this essay, published at the eve of the modern choice of law
revolution in the United States, Hancock warns against a rules approach,
even as the rules are changing in a more 'progressive' way.6 5 The
alternative to the traditional or classificatory approach, as he emphasizes,
is not 'better rules' but the rejection of rules and the adoption of an
approach to choice of law that is based on considerations of policy and
fairness.
Essays 3 to 7, which discuss choice of law in practice, primarily within
the torts area, were written in the period 1973-9, after the modern choice
of law revolution in the United States had taken hold. In these essays
Hancock applies his analytical framework for resolving choice of law
questions on the basis of considerations of policy and fairness to a number
of the 'leading' contemporary torts choice of law cases. He is particularly
concerned with developing techniques of reconciliation for the true
conflict, the situation where both the involved states have a real interest in
having their law applied in order to implement the policy reflected in the
law. Currie maintained, and I agree, 66 that in the case of the true conflict,
the forum should apply its own law, and this has been the result that has
generally obtained in practice.6 7 Hancock disagrees and looks for
techniques of reconciliation to resolve the true conflict. The essence of
these techniques of reconciliation is a searching examination of the
policies reflected in the differing rules of substantive law, including the
strength with which that policy is held by the respective states and the
present-day soundness of that policy.
In the third essay, 'Anti-guest statutes and marital immunity for torts in
conflict of laws,' Hancock begins by discussing the seminal case of Babcock
v. Jackson,68 which sparked the modern choice of law revolution in the
United States. Babcock was again the classic false conflict situation, where
two parties from New York, which did not have a guest statute, were
65 Hancock 53
66 See supra note 27.
67 See the discussion of this point in Sedler, supra note io, 23 1-3.
68 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963)
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involved in an accident on a day trip to Ontario, which at that time did.6 9
In that case, the New York Court of Appeals squarely rejected the place of
the wrong rule of the traditional approach, and held that the law of the
parties' home state, New York, should determine the question of guest-
host immunity.7° Hancock states:
The outstanding characteristic of the methodology adopted in Babcock v. Jackson
was its primary emphasis upon the policies and practical effects of the divergent
rules involved. It also sought to provide a test to assist judges in making a choice
between the divergent rules. This test was easily applied in the Babcock case
because the facts obviously fell within the policy-determined range of the New
York compensatory rule and outside that of the Ontario statute giving immunity
to negligent host-drivers. 7'
After discussing Babcock and the 'easy' false conflict situation, 7 Han-
cock quickly moves to his primary concern: 'What should a court
69 The Ontario guest statute, prior to its repeal in 1977, contributed to the existence of a
number of important American conflicts cases because of the proximity of Ontario to
New York, Michigan, and Minnesota. See, e.g., Abendschein v. Farrell 382 Mich. 510, 170
N.w.2d 137 (1969) (New York plaintiff and Michigan defendant involved in accident in
Ontario); Kasier v. North, 292 Mich. 49,289 N.W. 325 (1939) (Michigan parties involved
in accident in Ontario); Macey v. Rozbicki 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 38o (1966) (New
York parties involved in accident in Ontario); Milkovich v. Saari 295 Minn. 155, 203
N.w.2d 4o8 (1973) (Ontario parties involved in accident in Minnesota); Neumeier v.
Kuehner 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454 (1972) (Ontario plaintiff and New York
defendant, involved in an accident in Ontario). The Ontario guest statute was also the
basis of the conflict of laws in the leading conflicts torts case in Canada. McLean v.
Pettigrew 11945] S.C.R. 62.
70 It was not necessary for the court in Babcock to come down in favour of any specific
methodological approach to choice of law, because the application of New York law on
the issue of guest-host immunity would follow under any modern approach to choice
law. In terms of interest analysis, it was the false conflict, since only New York had a real
interest in applying its law to this case involving New York parties injured in a guest
statute state. New York was also the 'state of the most significant relationship,' within
the meaning of the Restatement Second's approach, since all the factors the Restatement
considers relevant in tort cases except for the accident itself occurred in New York. The
opinion of the New York Court of Appeals took an eclectic approach, mixing interest
analysis and factual contacts and so 'contained some comfort for all critics of the
traditional system.' Currie, Comments on Babcock v.Jackson (1963) 63 Col. L.R. 1233, at
1234. For a discussion of post-Babcock developments in New York, see Sedler, supra
note 13, 983-94.
71 Hancock 6o-i
72 As stated previously, there is substantial agreement among academic commentators
today that in the case of the false conflict the law of the only interested state should
apply. See supra note 26. In practice, where the false conflict is brought in the
disinterested state, as it occasionally is, the forum is likely to displace its own law in
favour of the law of the only interested state. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Schwartz 103 Ariz.
562,447 P.2d 245 (1968). For a review of other cases in which the forum concluded that
it did not have a real interest in applying its law and applied the law of the only 'really
interested' state, see Sedler, supra note lo, 222-7.
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committed to a policy-determined analysis of choice cases do when it
appears that, though the factual contacts of a case bring it within the
policy range of a rule of the forum, they also bring it within the policy
range of a divergent rule of another state?' 73 Looking to what he saw some
courts doing in particular cases presenting this true conflict and to the
views expressed by some other commentators, he concluded that there
were adequate techniques of reconciliation, so that it was not necesaary
for the forum to resolve the true conflict simply by its applying its own law.
The two major techniques of reconciliation advocated by Hancock are
what he refers to as 'domestic construction analysis' and the 'better law'
analysis. Under the 'domestic construction analysis,' the forum court
should look to how it and the courts of the other involved state have
construed their respective laws. If the applicable law of one of the states
has been given a restricted construction, this would indicate that the
policy reflected in that law is not strongly held in that state, so that this
policy may properly be made to yield to the more strongly held policy of
the other involved state in a conflicts case.
7 4
As a practical matter, where a conflict of laws exists between two
American states, it is almost invariably because one state has enacted a
statute that changes the common rule remaining in force in the other
state. 75 In the examples that Hancock uses in this essay, the conflict arises
in the guest statute situation because one state has enacted a guest statute
changing the common law rule of liability of all persons for ordinary
negligence, while the other state has not, and in the spousal immunity
situation the conflict arises because one state has enacted a statute
abolishing the common law rule of spousal immunity, while the other has
not. So, the forum court - which in all the cases that Hancock discusses
is the state that imposes liability - should study how the courts of the guest
statute state or spousal immunity state have interpreted their rule in the
domestic context. He writes: 'If these states evince a trend toward giving
the anti-guest statute or marital immunity rule a restricted construction,
the judge may conclude that he would be fully justified in giving it a re-
stricted construction in the choice case before him.'
76
In discussing the cases in which the defendant has asserted the guest
statute of defendant's home state to avoid liability, although the accident
73 Hancock 63. As I would put it, in this situation both states have a real interest in
applying their law in order to implement the policy reflected in that law.
74 Policy-weighing is also proposed as one of the means of resolving true conflicts by
Professors Von Mehren and Trautman, supra note 21, 376-92.
75 See the discussion of this point in Sedler, supra note 8, 597-8. The same is true in
Canada, of course, since the common law rules are the same in all the provinces.
76 Hancock 97
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occurred in a liability state 77 or the plaintiff was from a liability state, 78
Hancock maintains that the guest statute had been given a limiting
construction by the courts of the enacting state. 79 He makes the same
showing as to the spousal immunity rule of the defendant's home state in
cases where spouses from an immunity state were involved in an accident
in a recovery state. 80 This being so, he contends that the conflict should be
resolved in favour of the application of the law of the state allowing
recovery. Since the rule denying recovery has been given a limited
construction by the courts of the state having that rule, it should not be
applied in a conflicts case where the law of the other involved state allows
recovery.
8 1
Under the 'better law analysis,' the court should consider whether the
substantive law of one of the involved states is anachronistic, whether
commentators tend to favour or oppose it, and as evidence of its current
unsoundness, whether it has been given a limited construction in the state
where it is in force.8 ' Not unsurprisingly perhaps, Hancock concludes that
guest statute immunity and spousal immunity are anachronistic and that
under the 'better law' analysis they shuld be rejected in favour of the law
of the state allowing recovery. 83
He continues to develop these techniques of reconciliation in the fourth
and fifth essays. The cases he discussed fall into three typical fact-law
77 Such as Conklin v. Horner3 8 Wis.2d 468,157 N.w.2d 579 (1968), and Kellv. Henderson
47 Misc.2d 992, 263 N.Y.s.2d 647 (Sup. Ct. 1965), affd., 26 App.Div.2d 595, 270
N.Y.s.2d (3 d Dept. 1966)
78 Such as Cipolla v. Shaposka 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1790)
79 Hancock 66-7 (Ontario guest statute involved in Kell); ibid. 70-1 (Illinois guest statute
involved in Conklin); ibid. 72-5 (Delaware guest statute involved in Cipolla). Hancock
also makes the point that if a law such as a guest statute is repealed after the event in
issue occurred, this is evidence that the policy reflected in the law was not strongly held
at the time the event occurred. Ibid. 77-8.
8o Ibid. 84-9o, 97-8
81 Although Hancock does not specificially discuss a limiting construction to the rule of
the involved state that allows recovery, this technique of reconciliation would be equally
applicable to such a rule. He states subsequently: 'While the term, true conflict case, is
useful in making a preliminary analysis of policies and interests, it would be a great
mistake to assume that, in all true conflicts cases, the strength and significance of the
policies of the States concerned are always approximately equal. As the analysis of such
cases in Part i has shown, the claim of one State to have its law and policy enforced
sometimes appears much stronger, and more appealing and persuasive than that of the
other.' Ibid. 140.
82 Ibid. 98, 141. As Hancock notes, the 'better law analysis' was developed by Leflar; see
generally Leflar, supra note 6, as one of the choice-influencing considerations.
Hancock 78. Leflar, however, subsequently appeared to discuss the 'better law analysis'
as a description ofjudicial behaviour, not as a normative prescription. Leflar, The 'new'
choice of law (1972) 21 Am. L.R. 457, at 474.
83 Hancock 69-70, 98
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patterns:8 4 1 / two parties from a liability state are involved in an accident
in a non-liability state; 2 /a liability state plaintiff is injured by a non-liability
state defendant in the defendant's home state and suit is brought in the
plaintiffs home state85; 3 / a non-liability state plaintiff is injured by a
liability state defendant in the defendant's home state. In the first
situation Hancock maintains that the state of injury has a real interest in
applying its law allowing recovery in favour of a non-resident injured
there,8 6 so the true conflict is presented there, as it is in the second
situation, where the plaintiff is from a liability state. The third situation
presents what has been called the unprovided-for case: neither state has a
real interest in having its law applied in order to implement that policy
reflected in its law. 8 7
84 As to fact-law patterns in torts cases, see supra note 1 2.
85 Jurisdiction may exist in the courts of the plaintiffs home state either because the
underlying transaction giving rise to the accident had some factual connections with the
plaintiff's home state, so that jurisdiction may be based on forum-transaction contacts
(see, e.g., Foster v. Leggett 484 s.w.2d 827 (1972), where the trip began in Kentucky and
was to end there but the accident occurred in Ohio), or because the defendant had
substantial connections with the forum, such as 'doing business' there, so that
jurisdiction may be based on forum-defendant contacts (see, e.g., Schwartz v. Consoli-
dated Freightways 300 Minn. 487, 221 N.W.2d 665 (1974), cert. denied, 425 U.s. 959
(1976), where the accident involving a Minnesota plaintiff and an Ohio corporation
occurred in Ohio, but the corporation also did substantial business in Minnesota).
There are no reported cases involving the fact-law pattern of a recovery state
plaintiff injured by a non-recovery state plaintiff in the plaintiff's home state. In that
situation, the plaintiff will sue in the home state, obtaining jursidiction under the
long-arm act, and that court - regardless of the approach it takes to choice of law - will
apply its own law, allowing recovery.
86 Hancock 46. Hancock says that this interest is not.present in the case of wrongful death,
since there is no danger that the victim will become a public charge in the forum, and
since the payment will be directly to the beneficiaries and will not be available to satisfy
the claims of local medical creditors. Hancock 131-2.
87 See the discussion of the unprovided-for case in Sedler, supra note to, 189-go. In
practice, it is the unprovided-for case that has given the courts the most difficulty. This
is because the unprovided-for case cannot be resolved solely with reference to the
interests of the involved states, since by definition neither state has an interest in
applying its law on the point in issue. To put it another way, Currie's interest analysis
methodology can identify the unprovided-for case, but it cannot as such provide a
means for its resolution. My own view is that the unprovided-for case can ordinarily be
resolved with reference to the common policy reflected in the laws of the involved sates.
Usually the point as to which the laws of the involved states differ involves a substantive
rule that is an exception to the common policy reflected in what may be called the
general law of both states. Since the state whose law represents an exception to that
policy has no interest in having its law applied in the circumstances of the particular
case, the common policy should come to the fore, and the exception should not be
recognized. For example, since guest statute immunity represents an exception to the
common policy of all states in allowing recovery for ordinary negligence, and since the
only state interested in extending such immunity to the defendant, the defendant's
home state, does not do so, the defence of guest statute immunity should not be
MOFFATT HANCOCK AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 81
In all these situations, Hancock's techniques of reconciliation generally
end up in favour of application of the law of the state allowing recovery.
Where the law shielding the defendant from liability is a guest statute, 88 as
it is in most of the cases discussed, he relies both on the limited construc-
tion given the guest statute by the courts of the enacting state8 9 and on the
fact that guest statutes are anachronistic. 90 In the unprovided-for case, he
adds another technique of reconciliation, which results in the application
of the law of the state allowing recovery. This may be referred to as the
subsidiary policy of the law of the state denying recovery. He contends
that the domestic law of a state like Ontario that at that time had a guest
statute actually reflects two policies: one of allowing recovery for ordinary
negligence in most cases and another of protecting host-drivers from suits
for ordinary negligence by guest passengers. Since Ontario would have
had no real interest in applying its host-protecting policy in favour of a
non-resident defendant the court should give effect to the subsidiary
compensatory policy of Ontario law by allowing recovery. 9 '
Hancock's analytical framework for resolving choice of law questions
thus combines the functional and result-selective approaches that he
identified in the 1961 article. The starting point in choice of law analysis is
a consideration of the policies reflected in the laws of the involved states
and the interest of each state in having its law applied to implement those
policies in the particular case. Where only one state has a real interest in
having its law applied, the law of that state should be applied. Where both
the involved states have a real interest in having their laws applied - the
true conflict - or where the policy reflected in the laws of neither state will
be advanced by its application in the particular case - the unprovided-for
case - he would resolve the choice of law issue by the use of techniques of
reconciliation. The essence of the techniques of reconciliation is a
searching examination of the policy reflected in a rule of substantive law,
including the strength with which the policy is held and the present-day
soundness of that policy. The two major techniques of reconciliation that
follow are 'domestic construction' analysis and the 'better law' analysis. In
the conflicts torts cases discussed by Hancock, these techniques of
recognized. See the discussion in Sedler, supra note 1o, 235-6. In practice, the courts
use different rationales, but most of the time they end up applying the law of the state
that allows recovery. Ibid. 233-4, n. 283.
88 See supra notes 77, 78.
89 Hancock 107-10
90 Ibid. See also the discussion at 121-2, concerning the anachronistic nature of
limitations on liability for wrongful death, as well as guest statutes.
gi As applied here, this technique of reconcilitation operates in the same manner as the
common policy rationale that I favour. See supra note 87.
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reconciliation almost always result in the application of the law of the state
allowing recovery, because the law of the state denying recovery usually
will have been given a limited construction by the courts of that state, and
further will be found to be 'anachronistic' at the present time.
Hancock's advocacy of techniques of reconciliation for the resolution of
the true conflict accords with the predominant view among conflicts
commentators today. Most commentators maintain that the result in a
conflicts case should not differ depending on the forum in which suit is
brought, so they reject Currie's contention that the forum should always
apply its own law in the case of the true conflict. While many other
commentators have also developed solutions to the true conflict other
than the application of the forum's own law,92 Hancock's techniques of
reconciliation are perhaps the most directly policy-oriented, since they do
not go beyond the policies reflected in involved laws themselves. They
look to the strength of the policy embodied in the law and to the
present-day soundness of that policy. The objective of these techniques of
reconciliation, related to Hancock's analytical framework for resolving
choice of law questions, is to achieve a functionally sound result in the case
before the court. This, I believe, is the purpose of the conflict of laws in
the legal system and the proper role of a court in a conflicts case. Hancock
has developed an analytical framework, including these techniques of
reconciliation, that is indeed suitable for the performance of the court's
role in a conflicts case.
93
92 It has been observed that '[tioday's Great Quest in choice of law is for tools to reduce
and to resolve true conflicts.' Cramton, Currie, and Kay Conflict of Laws (3 d ed. 1g81)
291. Some of these methods include: Weintraub's functional analysis (see generally
Weintraub, supra note 21, summarized in Cramton, Currie, and Kay 376-9); Von
Mehren and Trautman's functional analysis, supra note 21 (summarized in Cramton,
Currie, and Kay 373-6); Baxter and Horowitz's comparative impairment (see Baxter,
Choice of law and the federal system (1963) 16 Stan L.R. 1, Horowitz, The law of choice
of law in California - A restatement (1974) 21 U.C.L.A.L.R. 719, summarized in
Cramton, Currie, and Kay 291-7); Cavers' principles of preference (see generally
Cavers, supra note 6, summarized in Cramton, Currie, and Kay 341-7); and
McDougal's comprehensive interest analysis (see McDougal, Comprehensive interest
analysis versus reformulated governmental interest analysis: An appraisal in the
context of choice-of-law problems concerning contributory and Comparative Negli-
gence (1979) 26 U.C.L.A.L.R. 439). Leflar's choice-influencing considerations ap-
proach also may be viewed as a method of resolving true conflicts other than by the
application of the forum's own law.
93 I have always believed that academic commentators tend to take an unduly complex
view of the choice of law process and tend to have a rather grandiose conception about
the function of conflicts law in the legal system. The purpose of conflicts law, as I see it,
is to provide functionally sound and fair solutions for those relatively few cases that arise
in practice in which a court has to make a choice of law decision, and the proper role of
the court is to make a functionally sound and fair decision in those cases. A court has to
make a choice of law decision in an actual case only when i / the case is connected with
more than one state and 2 / the laws of the involved states differ on the point in issue.
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Nonetheless, I am in disagreement with him over whether the courts
should employ techniques of reconciliation in the case of the true conflict.
94
Like Currie, I maintain that in the case of the true conflict the forum
should apply its own law. I have stated the reasons for my position
elsewhere and will not repeat them here. 95 Rather, I want to raise another
question: what is the significance in practice of the techniques of reconcilia-
tion that Hancock proposes? My submission is that in the cases that do
arise in practice, the results generally will not differ depending on
whether the court employs his techniques of reconciliation or applies the
law of the forum in the true conflict situation. And in fact, he almost
appears to concede as much. He states:
That most cases have resulted in a decision to apply a rule of forum law favouring
the plaintiff, does not mean that the judges have been indulging in a parochial
preference for forum law. The obvious reason is that a plaintiffs counsel will
normally bring his suit in a State whose pertinent rule of domestic law favours his
client. He will also believe he can persuade the court to apply that rule because of
contacts with the forum. Tort choice actions are very rarely brought in States
whose law would favour the defendant. 96
Hancock is, of course, correct on this score. But if the techniques of
reconciliation that he proposes have any efficacy in practice, it should not
be necessary for the plaintiff to bring suit in the courts of the state whose
substantive law favours the plaintiff. Where suit is brought in the
defendant's home state - such as wherejurisdiction cannot be obtained in
the plaintiff's home state or counsel for the plaintiff failed to 'forum-shop
for a more favourable law'97 - that court should apply techniques of
reconciliation and should displace its own law even where it has a real
interest in applying its law in order to implement the policy reflected in
that law. This simply does not happen in practice. Whenever the suit has
been brought in the defendant's home state and that state has a real
interest in applying its own law in order to implement the policy reflected
These cases are relatively few in number, for two reasons. First, despite the fact that we
live in a multistate world, most transactions, and thus most cases that arise in practice,
are connected with only one state. Second, even when a case is connected with more
than one state, most of the time the laws of the involved states will not differ on the
point in issue. So, even when a case is connected with more than one state, in practice
the case usually will not present a choice of law issue.
94 We are effectively in agreement as to how the court should resolve the unprovided-for
case. See supra note 9 1.
95 See, e.g., Sedler, supra note 10, 227-33; Sedler, supra note 8, 635-44.
96 Hancock 142
97 As Hancock notes above, astute counsel for the plaintiff will endeavour to bring suit in
the forum whose law favours the plaintiff.
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in that law, it has done so.98 Likewise, in practice the 'better law' analysis
has invariably meant preference for the forum's 'better law.' 99 Where the
forum's law was the 'worse law' and the forum had a real interest in
applying its law in order to implement the policy reflected in that law, the
forum has done so.'
Where the 'better law' analysis has proved important in practice is
where two parties from a non-recovery state are involved in an accident in
a recovery state. If suit is brought in the parties' home state, that state will
apply its own law denying recovery.'°' However, the plaintiff can always
sue in the state of injury, obtaining jurisdiction under the 'long-arm act'
(the American equivalent of service ex juris). In my view, the state of
injury does not have a real interest in applying its own law to allow
recovery, since in this day and age the accident victim will get back home
and the consequences of the accident and of allowing or not allowing
98 See, e.g., Maguire v. Exeter & Hampton Electric Co. 114 N.H. 589, 325 A.2d 778 (1974);
Snow v. Continental Products Corp. 353 F.Supp. 59 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Satchwill v. Vollrath
Co. 293 F.SUpp. 533 (E.D. Wis 1968); Wartell v. Formusa 345 Ill.2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544
(1966); McSwain v. McSwain 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966); Fuerste v. Bemis 156
N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1968); DeFoor v. Lematta 249 Ore. 116, 437 P.2d 107 (1968).
99 Leflar himself recognized that this was likely to happen: 'It is evident that the search for
the better rule of law may lead a court almost automatically to its own lawbooks. The
idea that the forum's own law is the best in the world ... is unfortunately but
understandably still current among some members of our high courts.' Leflar,
Choice-influencing considerations in conflicts law (1966) 41 N.Y.U.L.R. 267, at 298-9.
Similarly one court has given as its reason for rejecting the 'better law analysis' the fact
that 'it would result in the application of the law of the forum in each case because every
forum thinks it has created the best rule of law.' Tower v. Schwabe 284 Or. lo5, at i 1o,
585 P.2d 662, at 664 (1978). The only case that research has disclosed where the forum
has displaced its own law solely on 'better law' grounds is Bigelow v. Halloran 313 N.w.2d
1o (Minn. g8i), where in a suit involving a tort committed by a Minnesota defendant
against an Iowa plaintiff in Iowa, the Minnesota rule barring an action for intentional
torts after the death of either party was rejected in favour of Iowa's rule allowing the
cause of action to survive. They very next year, however, in a purely domestic case, the
Minnesota no-survival rule was declared to be violative of the equal protection clause of
the state constitution. Thompson v. Estate of Petroff 319 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 1982). So the
decision in Bigelow v. Halloran displacing the Minnesota law on 'better law' grounds, in
retrospect, was not very significant.
ioo As the Iowa court noted in Fuerste v. Bemis, supra note 98, where in a suit between Iowa
parties arising out of an accident in Wisconsin it refused to displace the Iowa guest
statute in favour of Wisconsin's 'better law': 'It is not for us to consider which is the
better law when the policy making body of the state has spoken ... Appellant believes the
Wisconsin rule is the better law. When he asks us to apply it to this case in which all
significant relationships are with the State of Iowa, he is in effect asking us to ignore all
other considerations ... Such a rule would eliminate the necessity for determining
which state had the strongest interest in the particular issue. The result reached in this
manner might have no more relevancy to the interests of the state with the most
significant relationships than the result reached by applying the law of the place of
injury.' 156 N.w.2d 834.
ioi See Wartell v. Formusa, McSwain v. McSwain, Fuerste v. Bemis, DeFoor v. Lematta, supra
note q8.
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recovery will be felt in the victim's home state.' °2 Therefore, I would
submit that when the real interests of the involved states are considered,
this case presents the false conflict in the same manner as the case where
two parties from a recovery state are involved in an accident in a
non-recovery state. Some courts have seen it this way and have applied the
law of the parties' home state denying recovery.' 3 The majority of the
courts passing on this question, however, have seen it differently and
have applied their own law allowing recovery, sometimes emphasizing
that their law was the 'better law."0 4 If the forum does have a real interest
in applying its own law, as Hancock maintains,'0 5 then the application of
the forum's law can bejustified on this basis without regard to whether it is
the 'better law.' But if the forum does not have a real interest, then the
'better law' consideration must be deemed to have produced a functionally
unsound result. In any event, the 'better law' analysis does not have any
efficacy in practice unless the forum is willing to displace its own law on
the ground that it is not the 'better law,' which is something that virtually
never happens in practice.
By the same token, the 'domestic construction' analysis is discussed by
Hancock in the context of the forum state, which allows recovery, looking
to whether the courts of the state whose law denies recovery have put a
limiting construction on that law. If the forum has a real interest in
applying its law and applies its law on that basis, the consideration of the
limiting construction put on the law of the other state by the courts of that
state turns out to be gratuitous. This technique of reconciliation has
efficacy in practice only if a state is willing to displace its own law, despite a
real interest in applying that law, because it has given its own law a limited
construction. Again, this is not very likely to happen in practice. 6
102 See t e discussion of this point in Sedler, supra note 64, 382-3.
103 See Vick v. Cochran 316 So.2d 242 (Miss. 1975); Mager v. Mager 197 N.w.2d 626 (N.D.
1972).
104 SeeArnett v. Thompson433 s.w.2d tog (Ky 1968); Milkovich v. Saari 295 Minn. 155, 203
N.w.2d 4o8 (1973); Gagne v. Berry 1 12 N.H. 125, 290 A.2d 624 (1972); Conklin v. Homer
38 Wis.2d 468, 157 N.w.2d 579 (1968). The 'better law' analysis was expressly employed
in all these cases except Arnett.
105 Hancock 64-5. Currie also maintained that the state of injury had an interest in
applying its law to enable the non-resident injured there to recover, because the
non-resident might become a public charge and might have incurred debts to local
creditors, which would be reimbursed out of the non-resident's tort recovery. Currie,
supra note 6, 145, 149.
lo6 The California Supreme Court pruportedly resolves the true conflict by looking to the
'comparative impairment' of the respective policies of the involved states. In Bernhard
v. Harrah's Club 16 Cal.3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, cert. denied, 429 u.s. 859 (1976), California
had a real interest in applying its law imposing liability against the seller of intoxicating
beverages for harm caused by an intoxicated patron in favour of a California plaintiff
injured by such an intoxicated patron in California. The defendant was a Nevada
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My point, then, is that the techniques of reconciliation advocated by
Hancock, like other methodologies for resolving the true conflict, do not
have much significance in practice. They would be significant only if they
led the forum court to displace its own law in a case where the forum has a
real interest in applying its law in order to implement the policy reflected
in that law. This does not happen in practice, and as I have demonstrated
elsewhere, the results that courts reach in practice are generally consistent
with the results favoured under the Currie version of interest analysis. 'o 7
Likewise, the results favoured by Hancock in the application of his
techniques of reconciliation to the true conflict cases he discusses are also
generally consistent with the results favoured by the Currie version of
interest analysis. In these cases the plaintiff has brought suit in a state that
in Hancock's view has a real interest in applying its law in order to enable
the plaintiff to recover. If this is so, then the application of the law of that
state is called for under Currie's version of interest analysis as well as
under Hancock's techniques of reconciliation.
So, if Hancock's techniques of reconciliation, like Currie's interest
analysis, seem to be plaintiff-oriented, it is because the plaintiff has
tavernkeeper who operated in close proximity to the California border and advertised
extensively in California. The California court said that Nevada's policy would be
'comparatively less impaired' if it were required to yield in the particular case and
applied California law imposing liability. I have used this case as an example of the
situation where a court, purportedly applying techniques of reconciliation for the true
conflict, skews those criteria in favour of the application of its own law. Sedler, supra
note 1o, 232-3.
In Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co. 22 Cal. 3 d 157, 585 P.2d 721 (1978), an
employee of a California corporation was injured in Louisiana when he was inspecting
equipment leased to a Louisiana corporation there. The California corporation
brought suit against the Louisiana corporation in California, where it was doing
business, to recover damages it had incurred by the loss of the employee's services.
Louisiana, like practically every other state, does not recognize an action by the
employer to recover for the loss of an employee's services. The plaintiff contended that
such an action was recognized under California law, but the California Supreme Court
had never expressly held that it was. In this case, the California Supreme Court
assumed arguendo that such an action might exist, and if it did, a true conflict would be
presented. It then applied the 'comparative impairment' technique of reconciliation
and, referring to the plaintiff's claim as 'unusual and outmoded,' resolved the conflict
in favour of the application of Louisiana law. It may be suggested that by yielding to
Louisiana's interest in this 'throwaway' case, the California court would appear to be
applying 'comparative impairment' evenhandedly while ensuring that California law
would apply in a case such as Bernhard, where California in fact had a real interest in
applying its law in order to implement the policy reflected in that law. See also the
discussion of what the California Supreme Court did in Offshore in Kabnowitz,
Comparative impairment and the better law: Grand illusions in the conflict of laws
(1978) 39 Hastings L.J. 255 at 294-300; Kay, The use of comparative impairment to
resolve true conflicts: an evaluation of the California experience (ig8o) 68 Cal. L.R.
577, at 586-91.
107 See Sedler, supra note sO, 231-3.
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brought suit in the state whose law allows recovery. Currie favours
application of the law of that state because of its real interest in applying its
law to allow recovery, while Hancock is likely to favour application of the
law of that state because the law of the other state denying recovery has
probably received a limited construction and is probably 'ana-
chronistic.'s8
My conclusion in this regard, then, is that interest analysis, as developed
by Currie, and the analytical policy-based framework for resolving choice
of law questions, including techniques of reconciliation for the true
conflict, as developed by Hancock, generally lead to the same results in the
torts cases that arise in practice. The only time that Hancock and Currie
would reach a different result is in the fairly rare case where the law of the
defendant's home state does not impose liability and suit is brought in that
state. ' 9 In that circumstance, the techniques of reconciliation advocated
by Hancock could see the forum displacing its own law in favour of the law
of the plaintiffs home state allowing recovery, while Currie maintains
that the defendant's home state should apply its law denying recovery. In
practice, the few courts faced with this case have thus far agreed with
Currie. "'
The unifying theme of essays 9 through 12 is the applicability of policy
analysis to property conflicts questions, primarily those regarding land.
In retrospect these essays represent a very important contribution to an
understanding of modern conflicts law in the United States. They
demonstrate that policy analysis, originally developed in the context of
resolving conflicts torts questions, can be applied with equal efficacy and
validity to the resolution of all conflicts questions, including those in the
more 'arcane' property area. The essential thrust of these essays is
directed towards challenging the 'land taboo': the view that all questions
relating to land must be determined by the law of the situs.
Hancock applies a policy analysis to typical conflicts questions concern-
io8 Under Hancock's techniques of reconciliation, the law of the plaintiff's home state
allowing recovery should be applied even if suit were brought in the defendant's home
state. This simply will not happen in practice, and if suit is brought in the defendant's
home state, the court will apply its own law, denying recovery, as Currie advocates. See
supra note 98.
1o9 I have made the same observation with respect to the techniques of reconciliation
advocated by Weintraub. Sedler, review, The last treatise, Weintraub's Commentary on
the Conflict of Laws (1972) 50 tex. L.R. 1o64, at 1075-8.
sio See supra note 98. Similarly, where the defendant's home state immunizes the
defendant from liability on contracts because of factors going to the defendant's status,
that state will apply its law in the event that suit is brought there. See, e.g., Lilienthal v.
Kaufman 239 Or. 1, 395 p.2d 543 (1964) (spendthrift immunity); Potlatch No. i Fed.
Credit Union v. Kennedy 76 Wash.2d 8o6, 459 P.2d 32 (1969) (marital property
immunity).
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ing land, such as what law should determine succession, and shows why
the law of the situs frequently should not be applied to resolve such
questions. This is because the connection between land and a state does
not necessarily give rise to an interest on the part of that state in having its
law applied to all questions involving that land. Currie made the point that
a factual contact with a state does not necessarily give rise to an interest in
having a particular rule of substantive law applied based solely on that
factual contact. For example, the fact that an automobile accident
occurred in a state does not give rise to an interest in having a rule of
substantive law having nothing to do with regulating driving conduct -
such as a guest statute - applied to determine rights and liabilities arising
out of that accident."' So too, the fact that land is located in a state does
not necessarily give rise to an interest in having a rule of substantive law
relating to land applied to determine rights and liabilities involving that
land. Indeed, as Hancock demonstrates in these essays, the situs qua situs
only has an interest in having its substantive law reflecting policies of land
utilization and land title applied to questions involving land located there.
Hancock illustrates the unsoundness of the 'situs rule' primarily in the
context of the use of the rule to determine succession to land. The use of
the situs rule in this context finds its origin in the English common law,
and unlike the situation prevailing in continental countries, reflects the
concept of split succession: succession to immovables is governed by the
law of the situs, while succession to movables is governed by the law of the
decedent's last domicile." ' Rules affecting succession to land may or may
not reflect a land utilization policy of the situs. The easiest point of
comparison is the difference between a mortmain statute and a deathbed
disinheritance statute. A mortmain statute does reflect a land utilization
policy of the situs, because it is designed to promote free alienability of
land. A deathbed disinheritance statute, by contrast, is designed to protect
the heirs and legatees of the decedent from losing any bequest, whether
of immovable or movable property, because of the decedent's 'deathbed
concern for salvation." '3 It follows under a policy analysis that the situs
has a real interest in applying its mortmain statute to determine
succession to situs land, notwithstanding that the affected parties are all
non-residents, but does not have a real interest in applying its deathbed
disinheritance statute solely on the basis of its connection with the land.
It also follows under a policy analysis that if the decedent is domiciled
in a state that does have a deathbed disinheritance statute, that state has a
xi See the discussion of this point in Currie, supra note 6, 143-4.
112 See the discussion of the origins of the situs rule in Hancock 300-3. See also the
discussion in McLeod The Conflict of Laws (1983) 414-15.
113 Hancock 226-8
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real interest in having its law applied notwithstanding that the affected
land is situated in another state. The all-embracing situs rule, however,
requires not only the application of a mortmain statute of the situs but also
the application of a deathbed disinheritance statute of the situs and
precludes the application of a deathbed disinheritance statute of the
decedent's last domicile." 
4
In these essays" "5 Hancock demonstrates the functional unsoundness of
the situs rule and shows how it has often been avoided in practice by the
use of manipulative techniques, particularly the fiction of equitable
conversion. "6 More importantly, he uses the theme of the 'land taboo' to
show how policy analysis can be applied to choice of law in the property
area, and thus why policy analysis is the proper analytical framework
within which to resolve all choice of law questions. These essays were
written between 1963 and 1967, at a time when the modern choice of law
revolution in the United States was just beginning, and policy-based
analysis was being applied primarily in tort cases. The rules of the
traditional approach, such as the situs rule to determine succession to
land, presumably were still being applied in the property area. Indeed,
even today relatively few conflicts property cases arise in practice. Perhaps
this is because parties have conformed their conduct to the requirements
of the presumably applicable law: for example, testators make sure that
their testamentary dispositions of land conform to the requirements of
the law of the situs. Sometimes, however, conflicts property cases do arise,
and the courts sometimes apply a policy analysis to resolve the conflict.' '7
In any event, in these essays Hancock applies a policy analysis to choice
114 Ibid. 228-30
115 Ch. i i,'Full faith and credit to foreign laws and judgments in real property litigation:
The Supreme Court and the land taboo,' deals with a problem of recognition of
judgments in the United States - whether a decree of a state court involving land situate
in another state is entitled to full faith and credit under art. iv, § 1 of the constitution.
While older United States Supreme Court cases indicated that such decrees were not
entitled to full faith and credit, it is assumed today that if the exercise ofjurisdiction by a
state other than the situs was valid as a matter of due process, full faith and credit
requires recognition of that decree by the situs. See, e.g., Varone v. Varone 359 r.2d 769
(7 th Cir. 1966) (sister-state decree to convey local land entered against defendant
subject to the jurisdiction of that court is entitled to full faith and credit at situs).
116 Hancock 242-6, 309-18
117 See, e.g., Estate of Crichton 20 N.Y.2d 124, 228 N.E. 799 (1967) (law of the marital
domicile, New York, determines the right of spouse to take against the will, although
Louisiana, where the assets were located, treated assets as community property, giving
greater rights to surviving spouse); Estate of Clark 21 N.Y.2d 478, 236 N.E.2d 152 (1968)
(law of marital domicile, Virginia, determines the right of spouse to take against the
will, although under law of New York, where the trust was being administered and
where the assets were located, the spouse could not take against the will, and although
the husband expressly stipulated in trust provision and will that New York law should
apply).
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of law issues involving land and demonstrates the circumstances where
policy considerations lead to the application of the law of the situs and the
circumstances where policy considerations dictate that the law of the situs
should be displaced. " 8 He uses as his starting point some of the then
contemporary conflicts property cases such as Toledo Society for Crippled
Children v. Hickcock," 9 where the situs of the land, Texas, applied its law to
uphold a 'deathbed disinheritance' that was invalid under the law of Ohio,
which was the state of the testator's domicile and the state where the
charitable institution carried on all its activities. He demonstrates why
Texas as the situs had no interest in applying its law on this point, because
the matter in issue did not involve any land utilization policy of the situs.' o
He also engages in an interesting historical examination, showing how in
the latter part of the nineteenth century some courts, by the use of
manipulative techniques and the like, effectively applied policy analysis to
conflicts questions involving land and avoided application of the situs
rule.' 2 ' The lesson of these cases, he says, was lost in the twentieth century,
as the commentators emphasized the 'technique of classification' and
ignored the 'technique of statutory interpretation."2 2
Hancock maintains in these essays that the 'technique of statutory
interpretation' or policy analysis, which was now being applied in the torts
area, had equal efficacy and validity in the property area. He concludes:
It is common knowledge that in the field of torts leading American courts have
pretty well abandoned the simplistic, traditional formula of the lex loci delicti
commissi and its concomitant escape devices ... In the usual case where the parties
and the facts had connections with the forum and one other state, these courts
have, in effect, approached the choice-of-law problem as a problem of statutory
118 It has been assumed that only the courts of this situs can constitutionally exercise
jurisdiction to determine succession to situs land. In any event, in practice, proceedings
involving succession to land will take place at the situs, so the question in practice is
whether the situs will apply its law to resolve all questions relating to succession to land.
i19 152 Tex. 578, 261 s.w.2d 692 (1953), cert. denied, 347 u.s. 936 (1954)
12o Hancock 225-38
121 Ibid. 238-6o
122 Ibid. 289-go. In ch. io he applies the same kind of analysis to In reMcDougal's Will 29
N.J. 586, 151 A.2d 540 (1959), affg per curiam 55 N.J. Super. 36, 149 A.2d 8oi (App.
Div. 1959), aff'g per curiam 49 N.J. Super. 485 140 A.2d 249 (Morris County Ct. 1958).
That case involved the validity of a holographic will executed by a testatrix domiciled in
California, directing that her land in New Jersey be sold and the proceeds divided. The
holographic will was valid under California law but not under New Jersey law.
Although only California had an interest in applying its law on this issue (Hancock 299),
the New Jersey courts, applying the situs rule and refusing to use the equitable
conversion fiction, invalidated the will under NewJersey law. Ibid. at 318-21. Likewise,
in ch. 11 he applies this analysis to In reEstate of Barrie 240 Iowa 431, 35 N.W.2d 658,
cert. denied, 338 u.s. 815 (1949), where Iowa, the situs, applied its law to resolve the
question of whether the decedent, a resident of Illinois, had revoked her will.
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construction by inquiring whether the case fell within the policy scope of the
forum's domestic rule or that of the other state's rule. Courts approaching the
cases in this way have been able to explain their decisions as rational reconcilia-
tions of the divergent laws and policies of the states concerned. There is no reason
that a similar enlightenment should not spread into the field of real property
transactions. '
2 3
His hope was that the future would see judges 'distinguishing explicitly
between those laws of the forum-situs whose policies require their
application and those whose policies do not." 
2 4
Relatively little academic commentary in the United States has been
devoted to the application of policy analysis to the resolution of conflicts
problems in the property area. Perhaps this is because such questions
rarely arise in practice. But it may also be because these essays of
Hancock's have demonstrated the applicability of policy analysis to
property conflicts questions so cogently that further demonstration of this
point would be somewhat redundant. 2 5
123 Hancock 389
124 Ibid. 390
125 For the application of a policy analysis to conflicts property questions see also
Weintraub Commentary on the Conflict of Laws (2d ed. 198o) ch. 8.
Some courts are now getting away from the 'land taboo' and the automatic
application of situs law in land cases, and are explicitly applying a policy analysis to
determine the applicable law. In Rudow v. Foge1426 N.E.2d 155 (Mass. App. ig8i), the
claimants were all residents of New York, and the land was locted in Massachusetts. The
conveyance of the land between family members in that case apparently would have
given rise to a constuctive trust under New York law, but not under Massachusetts law.
The Massachusetts court, noting that it had 'rejected the notion that a single test is
appropriate for determining which law governs all questions relating to a transaction'
(426 N.E.2d 158), likewise rejected application of the law of the situs to determine the
question presented in this case. It cited Hancock's article on 'Conceptual devices for
avoiding the land taboo in the conflict of laws' (ch. 12) and said, 'The most important
interest of the situs in land transactions is the protection of bona fide purchasers or
other persons who rely on record title.' Ibid. 159. Since the matter in issue in that case
did not relate to land title but to the obligations of family members with respect to
property conveyed by one family member to another, New York, the domicile of the
family members, rather than Massachusetts, the situs, was the state interested in having
its law applied on this issue. Ibid. 16o.
Likewise, in In re Estate of Janney 498 Pa. 398, 446 A.2d 1265 (1982), the law of the
decedent's domicile rather than the law of the situs was applied to determine the formal
validity of the will. The decedent was domiciled in Pennsylvania and executed her will
conveying New Jersey land in Pennsylvania. The will was formally valid under
Pennsylvania law, but a New Jersey statute then in force would have voided the will
because one of the beneficiaries was an attesting witness. The land had been sold, and
the proceeds were before the Pennsylvania court for distribution. The court did not
resort to the equitable conversion fiction but held simply that the will should be valid
because 'no current policy of either state is offended by giving this testatrix her will.'
446 A.2d 1267. The court also noted: 'We do not doubt that the New Jersey courts, in
probating a NewJersey will, may give only prospective effect to their new Code. We are
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The final essay, 'The effect of a post-occurrence change of domicile
upon a choice of law determining the validity of other-insurance clauses
in an accident policy,' published in 1983, is built around the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,12
6
where the court defined clearly the present scope of constitutional
limitations on choice of law. The constitutional test for the validity of the
application of a state's law looks to whether the state 'has a significant
contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such
that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." 7 One
of the contacts discussed by the court in Allstate was the move by the
insured's widow to Minnesota, the forum, after the incident. Prior to the
accident the insured and his wife had lived across the state line in
Wisconsin, but the insured drove the insured vehicle to his Minnesota
workplace every working day. Three insurance policies covering the
automobile were in effect. Under Minnesota law, 'stacking' was per-
mitted, so that recovery would be permitted under all three policies.
Under Wisconsin law, the widow purportedly would be limited to a single
recovery.'" 8 Minnesota applied its own law, allowing 'stacking.' The
United States Supreme Court held that Minnesota had sufficient contacts
with the parties and the transaction, so that application of its law was
constitutional.
Hancock considered the significance of a post-occurrence change of
domicile in the earlier essay, 'The effect in choice of law cases of the
acquisition of a new domicile after the commission of a tort or the making
of a contract.' The reason why the post-occurrence change of domicile
would be relevant in choice of law analysis is that because of the change of
domicile, the new domicile could have an interest in having its law applied
in order to implement the policy reflected in that law. In Allstate, for
example, because of the widow's post-accident move to Minnesota, that
state would now have an interest in applying its law on the 'stacking'
question in order to enable its new resident to obtain greater insurance
not, however, probating a New Jersey will, but rather a will that observed all the
formalities of a valid execution under our law.' Ibid.
As the results in these cases indicate, the 'land taboo' may be disappearing, and policy
analysis is now starting to be used to resolve conflicts property questions.
126 449 u.s. 302 (1981)
127 449 u.s. 312-13 (opinion of Brennanj.). For my views on constitutional limitations on
choice of law, see Sedler, Constitutional limitations on choice of law: The perspective of
constitutional generalism (g81) 1o Hofstra L.R. 59. See also Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 105 S. Ct 2965 (u.s. S. Ct) (1985) (application of the law of forum to govern
all claims involving gas leases in class action case, as applied to claims where gas
leases and claimants had no connection with forum, was violative of due process).
128 Hancock suggests that it was possible that in the instant case Wisconsin law would not be
interpreted as precluding 'stacking.' Ibid. 396-97.
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recovery. So, the issue is whether interests for choice of law purposes
should be determined in the light of post-occurrence changes of
residence.
In the earlier essay, Hancock reviewed a number of actual and
hypothetical cases presenting this problem and made the following
observations: I / a distinction should be drawn between the situation
where the application of the law of the post-transaction domicile would
benefit the moving party and the situation where it would operate to that
party's disadvantage; 2 / in the former situation, the state of the
post-transaction domicile may have an interest in applying its law for the
benefit of its new resident,' 9 but this could result in unfairness to the
other party by allowing the moving party to improve his position by his
unilateral post-transaction act; 3 / in the latter situation, if the case had
originally presented a false conflict, the state of the new domicile would
not have any interest in applying its law because of the move, and if it
presented a true conflict, the new state's interest would not be streng-
thened or enlarged by the change of domicile.' 3 0
Hancock contended that where the application of the law of the new
domicile would benefit the moving party, so as to convert the case from a
false conflict into a true one, the law of the new domicile should usually be
disregarded. This was because true conflicts were not easily resolved, and
application of the law of the new domicile would usually involve some
unfairness to the non-moving party. 1' But where application of the law of
the new domicile would not create a true conflict,' 3 2 or where a true
conflict already existed,' 3 3 then some consideration should be given to the
129 This would be so in Allstate, since the effect of applying Minnesota law would be to allow
a greater insurance recovery to the insured's beneficiary, who was now a Minnesota
resident.
13o Hancock 175
131 Ibid. 76. I would submit, however, that the application of the law of the new domicile
would only produce unfairness if the other party had relied on the law of the other state
and that party's conduct would have been different if it could have been foreseen that
the law of the new domicile would apply. See the discussion of this point in Sedler,
supra note 1o, 239-42.
132 He uses as an example ofthis situation an unprovided-for case, with the plaintiff from a
non-recovery state and the defendant from a recovery state (see Erwin v. Thomas 264
Or. 454, 506 P.2d 494 (1973) and a post-occurrence move by the plaintiff to the re-
covery state. The move converts the case into a false conflict since the plaintiff's new
domicile now has a real interest in applying its law to allow recovery. Hancock 158.
133 He uses as an example of this situation what he considers to be a true conflict, with
parties from a state whose law upholds the validity of a marital exclusion clause in a
liability insurance policy involved in an accident in a state that invalidates such clauses.
Haines v. Mid-Centusy Insurance Co. 47 Wis.2d 4 4 2, 177 N.w.2d 338 (1970). If the parties
subsequently move to the state where the accident occurs, that state's interest in
applying its law to allow recovery is heightened, because the victim is now a resident of
that state. Hancock 158-62.
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plaintiff's change of domicile, possibly justifying application of the law of
that state.'
34
In the later essay, Hancock applied the conclusions of the earlier essay
to the factual situation presented in Allstate. Here, in his view, a true
conflict already existed at the time of the fatal accident. This was because
Minnesota, based on the husband's connection with Minnesota as a
long-standing member of its workforce, had a real interest in applying its
law to allow his widow greater insurance recovery for his death.' 35 The
post-occurrence change of the widow's domicile to Minnesota increased
that state's concern, and Hancock argues that effect should be given to a
state's total concern in the light of the policies involved.' 3 6 In the
circumstances of Allstate, therefore, he maintains that the application of
Minnesota law on the 'stacking' issue produced a functionally sound
result.' 3 7
Hancock's discussion of Allstate in the concluding essay demonstrates
most clearly the application of his analytical framework for resolving
choice of law questions on the basis of considerations of policy and
fairness. He shows how approaching choice of law questions within that
analytical framework is likely to lead to functionally sound results in the
134 Hancock 177-8. Hancock also emphasizes that effect should not be given to a
post-occurrence change of domicile where this would be fundamentally unfair to the
other party. He uses as an example the classic 'fundamental unfairness' case of John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates 299 U.S. 178 (1936). There, the insurance contract had
been entered into in New York, where the insured resided until his death. Under New
York law a false representation as to prior medical care enabled the insurer to avoid
liability on the contract. After the insured's death, the beneficiaries moved to Georgia,
and in a suit on the contract there, the Georgia court applied Georgia law, under which
the insurer would be held liable if the jury found that the false representation was not
Imaterial.' The application of Georgia law on this issue was fundamentally unfair to the
insurer, since the insurer was entitled to assume that it did not have to be concerned
about the accuracy of the information contained in the insured's application until the
insured died and a claim was made by the beneficiaries. Had it known that a different
standard was to be applied and that there would be an issue as to the materiality of the
false representations, the insurer presumably would have taken steps to cancel the
policy at an earlier time when proof of materiality was more likely to have been
available. In Yates, the United States Supreme Court held that application of Georgia
law on this issue was unconstitutional. See also the discussion of Yates in terms of
fundamental unfairness in Sedler, supra note 1 27, 89-91.
135 Hancock 407-10. My own view is that Minnesota's real interest in applying its law on
the 'stacking' question was predicated primarily on the fact that the insured was a
regular user of the Minnesota highways and the matter in issue concerned an
automobile insurance policy covering vehicles that he regularly drove into Minnesota.
Sedler, supra note 8, 642-3.
136 Hancock 415
137 And so disregarding the beneficiary's change of domicile would not resolve the true
conflict. But the change of domicile heightened Minnesota's interest in applying its law
to permit the widow to have the greater recovery. Hancock 415.
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particular case. And this is perhaps his greatest contribution to the
development of modern conflicts law in the United States. By identifying
the factors that should influence the choice of law decision and establish-
ing a sound analytical framework for making that decision, he has
furnished guidance as to how functionally sound choice of law results can
be achieved in actual cases.
3 Hancock and the development of conflicts
law in Canada: A look to the future
In two essays, 'Canadian-American torts in the conflicts of laws,' and
'Torts choice-of-law problems resolved by statutory construction: The
older English cases,' both published in 1968, Hancock tries to relate the
Anglo-Canadian approach to choice of law in torts cases to the develop-
ment of modern conflicts law in the United States. In these essays he
continues the advocacy of a policy-centred approach to choice of law in
Canada that marked the earlier stage of his career when he established
himself as a 'conflicts maverick' in Canada.
138
The focal point of these essays is an attack on the double-barrelled
Phillips v. Eyre formula for choice of law in torts cases, which requires that
in order for the plaintiff to recover in tort the defendant's conduct must
have been actionable under the law of the forum and 'notjustifiable by the
law of the place where it was done."3 9 As Hancock emphasizes, this
formula suffers from the same fundamental defect as the place of the
wrong rule of the traditional approach in the United States: 'Their chief
vice, common to both, is that they are crude and simplistic, trying to
resolve too many problems with a few words. They consequently point to
sound results in some cases and unsound results in others." 40
And, like the place of the wrong rule, the Phillips v. Eyre formula does
not by its terms take into account the policies and interests of the involved
states. Indeed, it would allow the application of the law of the forum in a
138 See supra note 2. In addition to Torts in the Conflict of Laws (1942), some of Hancock's
other Canadian writings are Torts in the conflict of laws: The first rule in Phillips v. Eyre
(1940) 3 U.T.L.J. 40o; Choice-of-law policies in multiple contact cases (1943) 5 U.T.L.J.
133.
139 'As a general rule, in order to found suit in England for a wrong alleged to have been
committed abroad, two conditions must be fulfilled. First, the wrong must be of such a
character that it would have been actionable if committed in England. Secondly, the act
must not have beenjustifiable by the law of the place where it was done.' Phillips v. Eyre
[1870] L.R. 6 Q.B. 1,2 8-9. Professor Hancock notes, 'These antiquated rules have been
the subject of much criticism, especially when used as criteria for deciding choice-of-law
cases in a Canadian province.' Hancock 18 1.
14o Hancock 197. He also notes that each rule 'has its own peculiar defects.'
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case that has no connection whatsoever with the forum except that the
defendant is subject to suit there.' 4 ' Hancock concludes:
It appears that for almost a century English and American courts have vainly
experimented with various comprehensive formulae for resolving interstate tort
cases, none of which have proven satisfactory. The number of different domestic
rules and the number of different configurations of facts and laws is so great that
no simple, comprehensive formula can rationally dispose of all the problems.
Each case as it arises must be separately resolved by determining the policy range
of each of the domestic rules involved. Simple, comprehensive formulae are
actually more a hindrance than a useful guide because they distract the judge's
attention from the real problems of ascertaining policy and policy range.' 42
As courts in the United States were turning towards a policy-centred
approach, it was obviously Hancock's hope that that approach would take
hold in Canada as well.' 43
It is perhaps unfortunate that he did not turn his attention back to
Canada in the years following. Nonetheless, these two essays, as well as his
earlier work directed specifically towards the Canadian scene, can serve to
furnish valuable guidance for the development of conflicts law in Canada
in the future. Using these essays as a starting point, we may consider the
relevance of the modern conflicts revolution in the United States to the
future development of conflicts law in Canada.' 44
The observations of an American commentator on this score obviously
should be received with appropriate caution, and they are made with
appreciation of the inherent limitations in commenting on a legal system
other than one's own. At the outset, it is necessary to point out some very
important structural differences between the Canadian and American
141 Hancock uses the example of the situation where both the host and guest passenger
were domiciled in Ontario and the accident occurred there, but the plaintiff brought
suit against the defendant in Quebec, obtaining jurisdiction on the basis of personal
service while the defendant was temporarily present there. In view of the Supreme
Court of Canada's interpretation of the second branch of the Phillips v. Eyre formula
(see the discussion infra 99-ioo), the Quebec court would have to apply Quebec law
and allow recovery. Hancock notes, 'A more outrageous example of unfairness to a
defendant and officious intermeddling with the legal concerns of a sister province
would be difficult to conceive.' Hancock 183. If Quebec were an American state court in
this situation, the application of its law would be violative of due process. See the
discussion supra 92.
142 Hancock 224
143 Ibid. 201-4, 224. He concludes: 'Each case as it arises must be separately resolved by
determining the policy range of each of the domestic rules involved. Simple,
comprehensive formulae are actually more a hindrance than a useful guide because
they distract the judge's attention from the real problems of ascertaining policy and
policy range.'
144 We will limit outselves to choice of law in torts cases. The overwhelming majority of
cases presenting conflicts questions in the United States are torts cases.
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legal systems that may affect the development of conflicts law in Canada
compared with such development in the United States.'
4 5
These structural differences involve the different kinds of court
systems and the different allocation of federal and provincial-state power
in our two countries. In Canada the court system is unitary, so that the
Supreme Court of Canada is the highest court of appeal for all of Canada
and has the ultimate authority to decide all questions of provincial law.
Since, in Canada as in the United States, there is relatively little legislative
direction as to choice of law,' 46 choice of law is a matter of common law.
This means that the Supreme Court of Canada, as the authoritative
expositor of the law of each province, imposes a uniform common law of
conflicts for each of the common law provinces and, as it has turned out,
for Quebec as well. ' 4 7 There is thus no opportunity for the court of appeal
of one province to change the approach to choice of law in that province
and thus to 'start a revolution.' If there is to be a fundamental change in
the approach to choice of law in Canada, it will have to come from the
Supreme Court. Of course, if such a change does come, it will be binding
throughout Canada.
In the United States, by contrast, there is a dual system of federal and
state courts, and the highest court of each state is the authoritative
expositor of the law of that state. The only role of the United States
Supreme Court in regard to choice of law is to set constitutional
limitations on choice of law, and those limitations are minimal. '4 8 Thus,
the approach to choice of law in the United States can differ structurally
from one state to another, and the modern revolution in choice of law in
the United States began by first one state and then another abandoning
the traditional approach. 149
145 The structural differences in the Canadian and American legal systems find their
source in what I have elsewhere referred to as differences in the structure of
constitutional governance. See the more detailed discussion in Sedler, Constitutional
protection of individual rights in Canada: The impact of the new Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms (1984) 59 NotreDameL.R. 1191, at 1195-1201.
146 See the discussion in McLeod, supra note 1 12, 14; Sedler and Cramton The Sum and
Substance of Conflict of Laws (2d ed. ig8i) § 1.2100.
147 See O'Connor v. Wray [1930] s.C.R. 231.
148 See the discussion of this point in Sedler, supra note 127, 68-74. The United States
Supreme Court recently referred to the due process clause and full faith and credit
clause as 'provid[ing] modest restrictions on the application of forum law.' Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, supra note 127, 2978. The holding in that case was that the
application of the forum's law to determine liability under a gas lease would be
unconstitutional where the gas lease and the claimant had no connection with the
forum.
149 For a review of the states that have abandoned the traditional approach and the year
that each state, usually in the context of rejecting the place of the wrong rule in tort
cases, abandoned that approach, see supra note 8.
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Secondly, unlike the exclusive allocation of federal and provincial
power in Canada under the Constitution Act, 1867, the United States
Constitution does not allocate power to the states. In American constitu-
tional theory, the sovereignty formerly possessed by the British Crown
devolved upon each of the states at the time of independence, so
American states do not depend on the federal Constitution as the source
of their power. 150 The states possess the general sovereign power, except
to the extent that the federal Constitution prohibits or restricts a
particular exercise of state power, which is very rare. 15 ' As a practical
matter, then, an exercise of state power, such as the application of a
statute extraterritorially to activity occurring elsewhere, cannot be found
to be ultra vires under the federal Constitution. If the fact situation in
Interprovincial Co-Operatives Ltd v. The Queen in Right of Manitoba,'5 ' for
example, had arisen in the United States - if Manitoba had been New
York, and Ontario and Saskatchewan had been Vermont and Pennsyl-
vania - there would have been no constitutional objection to New York's
applying its statute to impose liability on the out-of-state polluters. In
deciding on the application of its statutes to activities occurring in another
state, then, an American state court does not have to take into account the
possibility that such application will be constitutionally invalid.
Despite the structural differences between the Canadian and American
legal systems, as discussed above, Hancock demonstrates in these essays
that a policy-centred approach to choice of law is as suitable in Canada as it
is in the United States. However, while he decries the continued reliance
on the Phillips v. Eyre formula in torts cases, his analysis of Canadian
conflicts torts cases with reference to the result that was produced under
the application of that formula shows that in practice this formula may
sometimes produce 'the right result for the wrong reason."153 Going
15o See generally United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. 299 U.s. 304 (1936). State
sovereignty is affected by the federal constitution only in the sense that certain exercises
of state sovereignty, such as the power to coin money or the power to impose customs
duties, are specifically denied to the states or can only be exercised with Congressional
approval, under art. i, § io, or are implicitly denied because the matter in issue is
within the ambit of an exclusive federal power, such as the postal power. Regarding the
allocation of federal and state power, the federal Constitution confers enumerated
powers on the federal government and provides under the supremacy clause, art. vi, §
2, that in the case of a conflict between the exercise of federal and state power, the
exercise of federal power prevails. The principle that the states possess the general
sovereign power except as prohibited or restricted by the federal Constitution is
textually embodied in the Tenth Amendment.
151 For the most part, exclusive federal powers are limited to matters that by their nature
should be exercised by national authority, such as the power to declare war, or the
power to coin money, and the postal power.
152 [1976] 1 S.C.R. 477
153 Hancock 198
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further, it can be demonstrated that in the kinds of cases likely to arise in
practice, the application of the Phillips v. Eyre formula will frequently
produce the result that he favours.
Hancock refers to the 'manipulation of the Phillips v. Eyre formula to
obtain the desired result," 54 and says that the most important case where
this occurred was the leading case of McLean v. Pettigrew.'55 This case,
decided by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1945, is the last pronounce-
ment on choice of law in tort cases by the Supreme Court of Canada, and
thus is the starting point for the resolution of conflicts torts cases by the
Canadian courts.' 5 McLean presented a fact-law pattern identical to that
of Babcock v. Jackson,'5 7 with two parties from Quebec, which does not
have a guest statute, being involved in an accident in Ontario, which at
that time did. '58 While in Babcock, decided almost twenty years later, the
New York Court of Appeals abandoned the place of the wrong rule and
sparked the modern choice of law revolution in the United States, this
kind of behaviour could not have been expected on the part of a Canadian
court or an American court in 1945. However, American courts, when
presented with the case of two forum residents being involved in an
accident in another state, not infrequently resorted to manipulative
techniques to bring about the application of the forum's own law. In
retrospect, it can fairly be contended that the Supreme Court of Canada's
interpretation of the second branch of the Phillips v. Eyre formula with
reference to the oft-criticized Machado v. Fontes test in McLean' 59 was also
a manipulative technique designed to achieve a functionally sound result
in the particular case.
In terms of interest analysis, a case like McLean v. Pettigrew is the false
conflict brought in the interested state. In a case such as this, the first
branch of the Phillips v. Eyre formula enables the forum to apply its own
law allowing recovery. The problem comes with the second branch of the
formula, which requires the forum to look to the law of the place where
the accident occurred. If 'not justifiable where done' within the meaning
154 Ibid. 193
155 [1945] s.c.R. 62
156 See, e.g., Going v. Reid Brothers Motor Sales, Ltd. 35 O.R.2d 21o, at 204-205 (High Ct.
1982).
157 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963)
158 Hancock notes that in Babcock, 'when the New York Court of Appeals decided to allow
recovery by a guest in the teeth of the place of the wrong formula, the majority cited
McLean as a decision upon almost identical facts supporting their conclusion.' Hancock
193.
159 In Machado v. Fontes [1897] 2.Q.B. 231 (c.A.), the English Court of Appeal held that an
act was 'notjustifiable' under the law of the place where it was done, if that law imposed
criminal liability on the actor, although the act was not civilly actionable. For a review of
the criticism of Machado v. Fontes, see McLeod, supra note 112,539, n. 94-
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of the second branch means 'not actionable under the law of the place
where the act occurred,' as the House of Lords subsequently held,' 6 0 and
as appears to be the preferred academic interpretation,' 6' then the
application of the Phillips v. Eyre formula in McLean would have produced
the same result as the application of the place of the wrong rule would
have produced in Babcock. Recovery would have been denied because of
the Ontario guest statute, although Ontario would have had no interest in
applying its guest statute to enable a Quebec or New York defendant to
avoid liability to a Quebec or New York plaintiff. By following the 'not
wrongful' interpretation of 'not justifiable' adopted by the English Court
of Appeal in Machado v. Fontes, the Supreme Court of Canada in McLean
was able to bring about the application of Quebec law on the issue of
guest-host immunity. Since negligent driving was subject to criminal
sanction in Ontario, the defendant's act was 'not justifiable where done,'
and the second branch of the Phillips v. Eyre formula was satisfied.'
6
,
16o Chaplin v. Boys [1971] A.C. 356 (H.L. 1969). In that case, the plaintiff and defendants
were both British nationals on duty with Her Majesty's Armed Forces in Malta. The
plaintiff was injured in a road accident due to the negligence of the defendant, who was
insured in England by an English company. Damages for pain and suffering were
recoverable under English law but not under Maltese law. In a suit against the
defendant in England, the House of Lords held that English law should apply on the
issue of damages recoverable, but there was substantial disagreement as to the basis on
which English law should apply. In the course of the opinions setting out that
disagreement, there were three votes for overruling Machado v. Fontes and holding that
the Phillips v. Eyre formula required double actionability. See generally the discussion
of this case in McLeod, supra note s 12, 542-6.
What is most interesting to me as an American observer is that Chaplin v. Boys, like
McLean v. Pettigrew, like Babcock v. Jackson, and like so many other American cases,
presented the false conflict brought in the interested state, as well as the situation of two
forum residents involved in an accident in another state. All these courts reached the
some result in practice: the law of the forum allowing recovery applies. A majority of
the House of Lords in Chaplin v. Boys could 'afford' to say that the Phillips v. Eyre
formula required double actionability, since in that case tort liability was imposed
under Maltese law and the effect of the application of the formula was to allow recovery
under forum law. In order for the Supreme Court of Canada to reach that result in
McLean, it was necessary for that court to interpret the second branch of the Phillips v.
Eyre formula with reference to the Machado v. Fontes test. Neither the House of Lords in
Chaplin v. Boys nor the Supreme Court of Canada in McLean was willing to abandon the
Phillips v. Eyre formula, but neither court was willing to displace the law of the forum
allowing recovery either. If the Supreme Court of Canada had interpreted the second
branch of the formula as requiring double actionability in McLean, the law of the forum
allowing recovery would have had to be displaced.
161 See McLeod, supra note 1 12, 539, n. 4. This interpretation has long been followed in
Scotland. See e.g., M'Elroy v. M'Allister [1949l s.c. i o.
162 The court also held that it did not matter that the defendant had been acquitted on a
charge of careless driving arising out of the accident, because the acquittal in the
criminal action was not resjudicata in the civil action. In Howells v. Wilson 69 Que. K.B.
32 (1936), Quebec parties were involved in an accident in Vermont, which had a guest
statute. The Quebec court, applying the Phillips v. Eyre formula, relied on the fact that
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Let us now consider the implications of the holding in McLean v.
Pettigrew for other kinds of cases involving the now repealed Ontario
guest statute, or an extant law that immunizes the defendant from tort
liability because of the status of the parties.' 6 3 Let us posit a case where the
defendant is from Ontario (which we will assume still has a guest statute)
and the plaintiff is from Quebec - for example, a resident of Ottawa picks
up a friend in Hull for an evening's engagement, and there is an accident.
If the accident occurs in Hull, the plaintiff will have no problem
whatsoever. Suit can be brought in Quebec, with service ex juris being
appropriate against the Ontario defendant. 64 Since the accident oc-
curred in Quebec, the Phillips v. Eyre formula is not applicable, and
recovery is allowed under Quebec law.'65
Now suppose that the accident occurred in Ottawa. As a practical
matter, the plaintiff will still be able to bring suit in Quebec. Service ex
juris might be appropriate, since the underlying transaction giving rise to
the accident had factual contacts with Quebec.16 6 In any event, as things
now stand, in Canada jurisdiction may be founded solely on the basis of
personal service within the province.' 6 7 The Ontario defendant can
the defendant had pleaded nolo contendere to a change of reckless driving in Vermont
to find that the defendant's act was 'not justifiable where done.' Hancock 193-4.
In Lieff v. Palmer 63 Que. K.B. 278 (1937), Ontario parties were involved in an
accident in Ontario, but the plaintiff was able to bring suit in Quebec, obtaining
jurisdiction on the basis of personal service while the defendant was temporarily
present in Quebec. In such a case, the application of Quebec law would be patently
unreasonable, and had Quebec been an American state, unconstitutional. See supra
note 141. The Quebec courts managed to refuse to apply Quebec law in that case.
Hancock 195-6.
163 Such as spousal immunity
164 Moran v. Pyle Nat. (Can.) Ltd. [1975] 1 S.C.R. 393
165 The Phillips v. Eyre formula means that when the accident occurs in the forum the case
is treated as if it were a domestic case regardless of the residence of the parties.
166 It can be contended that in such a case there was a 'real and substantial connection
between the act and the forum' within the meaning of Moran. I s.c.R. at 4o8. In Foster v.
Leggett 484 s.w.2d 827 (Ky. 1972), the trip involving an Ohio driver and a Kentucky
passenger originated in Kentucky and was to terminate there. The fatal accident
occurred in Ohio. We would say that in such as case there were forum-transaction
contacts with Kentucky, so that the exercise of jurisdiction in Kentucky under a
long-arm act (the American equivalent of service exjuris) was valid as a matter of due
process. See the discussion in SedlerJudicialjurisdiction and choice of law in interstate
accident cases: The implications of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 Wash. U.L.Q. 329, at 332-3.
167 McLeod states the Canadian rule in this regard as follows: 'Any individual who is within
a country may be served with a writ in an in personam action. An individual is present
within a country (province) for the purposes of service, when he is physically present
within the country, regardless of the intended duration or purpose of his stay, his
nationality, his residence, or his domicile. The defendant must be present at the time
the writ is served, and not the time it was issued, unless he left the jurisdiction knowing
of the writ. The doctrine of forum non conveniens is often invoked to convince the court,
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conveniently arrange to be present in Quebec, and so be served with
process there in the suit brought by the Quebec plaintiff. 68 In the light of
McLean, the defendant's negligent driving in Ottawa could be found to be
subject to penal sanction in Ontario and thus the defendant's act would
not be justifiable where done' within the meaning of the second branch of
the Phillips v. Eyre formula. Quebec law allowing recovery would then be
applied by the Quebec court.
Quebec law allowing recovery would also be applied in the case where
two Ontario residents are involved in an accident in Quebec. Again,
service ex juris in Quebec is appropriate because the accident occurred
there, and likewise because the accident occurred in Quebec, the Phillips
v. Eyre formula is inapplicable. Hancock favours the application of
in its discretion, to decline to proceed with an action, because of the very tenuous nature
of the presence necessary to establish jurisdiction.' McLeod, supra note 1 12, 8o.
Since the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Shaffer v. Heitner 433 U.s.
186 (1977), it has been assumed that in the United States the exercise ofjurisdiction on
the basis of personal service in the state, without more, would be violative of due
process. In Shaffer, the Supreme Court invalidated the exercise of quasi in rem
jurisdiction, where, based on the presence of property in a state, the court exercised
jurisdiction over a claim not related to the property. In so doing the court discarded the
Ipower myth' ofjurisdiction and held that in all cases the exercise ofjurisdiction had to
satisfy due process standards of 'minimal contacts' and 'fundamental fairness.' As
Weintraub has noted, 'transient presence in the forum as a basis for jurisdiction
probably cannot stand scrutiny under this test.' Weintraub Commentay on the Conflict of
Laws (3 d ed. 1986) 151.
It may be queried whether the exercise ofjurisdiction on the basis of personal service
within the province, without more, would be subject to challenge under § 7 of the
Charter. While § 7 pointedly omits property rights from the list of protected rights, it
could be contended that a legal requirement that a party defend a case in court is an
interference with 'liberty,' and that the exercise ofjurisdiction on the basis of personal
service alone is not 'in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.' It will be
interesting to see whether constitutional objections will be interposed to the exercise of
jurisdiction on the basis of personal service alone.
168 This is what happened in Cipolla v. Shaposka 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970). The
plaintiff was a resident of Delaware County, Pennsylvania, and the defendant was a
resident of Wilmington, Delaware, just across the state line. The plaintiff and the
defendant attended school together in Wilmington, and the accident occurred in
Wilmington when the defendant was driving the plaintiff home. Delaware had a guest
statute, while Pennsylvania did not. The plaintiff brought suit in Pennsylvania. The
defendant was served there while he and the plaintiffwere playing golf together, and it
takes no feat of imagination to assume that this was prearranged. Ironically, this effort
to obtain the application of Pennsylvania law proved unavailing, for in this case the
Pennsylvania court applied Delaware law on the issue of guest-host immunity. Cipolla is
a relatively early case, as modern American conflicts cases go, and it is one of the very
few cases where the forum failed to apply its own law when it had a real interest in doing
so. See generally the discussion of this case in Hancock 72-6 and Sedler, The territorial
imperative: Automobile accidents and the significance of a state line (197 1) 9 Duq. L.R.
394.
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Quebec law allowing recovery in this situation.' 69 However, if I am correct
in my view that Quebec has no real interest in applying its law to enable an
Ontario plaintiff to recover against an Ontario defendant notwithstand-
ing that the accident occurred in Quebec, then the application of the
Phillips v. Eyre formula here would not produce a functionally sound
result. In this situation, an American state court could apply the law of the
parties' home state, denying recovery. But in Canada, because of the
approach to choice of law followed in tort cases, the province where the
accident occurred, here Quebec, must apply its law to any accident
occurring there.
In the unprovided for case, such as where the defendant is from
Quebec and the plaintiff is from Ontario, there will be recovery under
Quebec law irrespective of where the accident occurred. If the accident
occurred in Quebec, the Phillips v. Eyre formula is inapplicable and
Quebec law applies. If the accident occurred in Ontario, the plaintiff can
bring suit in Quebec, where the defendant resides, and in the light of
McLean, there will be a finding that the act was not justifiable where done.'
Again, in the unprovided for case, Hancock favours application of the law
that allows recovery,' 7' and that result will obtain here.
However, as Hancock also demonstrates, the use of manipulative
techniques may give rise to doctrine that, if consistently followed, will lead
to some results that are not functionally sound.' 7' The Phillips v. Eyre
formula, as interpreted in McLean, would require the application of
Quebec law in a case involving an accident between an Ontario host and
an Ontario passenger in Ontario so long as suit could be brought in
Quebec. In such a case the Ontario defendant, who presumably wants the
passenger to recover against the insurer, could conveniently arrange to be
served in Quebec. Quebec law would apply, since the tort would be
actionable if it had been committed in Quebec, and, in the light of McLean,
it could be found to be 'notjustifiable where done.' Such a result would be
unconstitutional as between states of the United States,' 72 but it is far less
clear that such a result would be violative of the Charter of Rights.' 73
169 Hancock 46
170 Ibid. 110-12
171 See the discussion, supra 70-1.
172 See supra note 141.
173 Since the effect of the court's decision in this case would only be to impose liability for
damages, it is difficult to see how it would interfere with a protected 'liberty' interest
under § 7 of the Charter. The choice of law limitations imposed by the due process
clause in the United States proceed upon the premise that a court's decision in private
litigation affects property rights. And the Charter contains no equivalent of the full
faith and credit clause, which also imposes some minimal limitations on choice of law in
the United States.
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A case presenting this situation actually arose before the Quebec King's
Bench prior to McLean,' 74 and that court managed to avoid applying
Quebec law.' 75 As Hancock puts it:
[S]ince the injury to the plaintiff occurred outside Quebec no rational claim
whatever could be made for the application of Quebec law. Ontario, on the other
hand, had a very strong claim for the application of its law, designed to protect
host-drivers and their insurers, to a controversy between parties who both
belonged to the Ontario political community. Why should Quebec, having no
concern in the matter, assist Ontario people to evade the law of their province?' 7
6
If a case such as this were to arise today, it would seem that the Quebec
courts, unless they were to hold that such a result would be violative of the
Charter, would be compelled under McLean to apply Quebec law and
allow recovery. Such an absurd result might persuade the Supreme Court
of Canada that it was time to reconsider its approach to choice of law in
torts cases and to abandon the Phillips v. Eyre formula in favour of a
policy-centred approach to choice of law. The result in McLean itself, of
course, is fully consistent with a policy-centred approach, because only
Quebec had any interest in applying its law in order to implement the
policy reflected in that law.'
77
Under the present state of the law in Canada, it would also seem that the
forum is directed to apply its own law allowing recovery in every case
involving an out-of-province accident, except where the defendant's
conduct is lawful under the law of the place where it occurred. Any
defences not going to lawfulness would have to be rejected, although the
defendant would not incur tort liability under the law of the place where
the accident occurred. For example, in Going v. Reid Brothers Motor Sales,
Ltd,' 7 8 Ontario plaintiffs were injured in an accident in Quebec and
brought a tort action against the defendants in Ontario. The corporate
defendant had its head office in Ontario, and the individual defendant
was a resident of Quebec.' 79 The defendants argued that the plaintiff
should be limited to the recovery authorized by the Quebec Automobile
Insurance Act, which would not include compensation for pain and
suffering. The act also extinguished the right of the victim to maintain a
tort action against persons responsible for the accident. This defence to
liability under Quebec law was rejected, since the defendant's conduct,




178 Supra note 156
179 It does not appear from the facts how jurisdiction was obtained over the individual
defendant.
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while not actionable in tort under Quebec law, was not lawful under
Quebec law.'so Here, as in the ordinary automobile accident situation, the
negligent party's conduct would probably be subject to sanction under the
highway traffic regulations of the province where the accident oc-
curred.' 8' Thus, the conduct would not be justifiable where done,' under
McLean, and the law of the forum, allowing recovery, would be applicable.
The point I wish to emphasize is that the Phillips v. Eyre formula, as
interpreted in McLean, will quite frequently permit application of the
forum's law allowing recovery in tort cases. The plaintiff will never bring
suit in the province whose law denies recovery, since the law of that
province would be applicable under the first branch of the Phillips v. Eyre
formula.' 8 ' Assuming that jurisdiction can be obtained in a forum whose
law allows recovery, that province's law will be applied unless the
defendant's conduct can be shown to be lawful under the law of the
province where it occurred. In the ordinary automobile accident situa-
tion, the negligent party's conduct would probably be violative of the
highway traffic regulations of that province, so such a showing could not
be made.' 8 3 As I have pointed out previously, in the United States the
plaintiff is very likely to sue in a state whose law allows recovery, and in
practice the forum will usually apply its own law allowing recovery. As a
practical matter, then, the results in conflicts torts cases in the United
States and in Canada will frequently be the same: the law of the forum
allowing recovery will be applied.
The Phillips v. Eyre formula, like the rules of the traditional approach,
does not by its nature distinguish between false conflicts and true conflicts.
As pointed out previously, if one of the involved Canadian provinces had
a guest statute, the Canadian plaintiff would sue in the province not
18o The Quebec Automobile Insurance Act by its terms applied to non-resident drivers
injured in Quebec. Statutory motor vehicle accident schemes in Canada generally
contain express legislative directives as to their application. See the discussion in
McLeod, supra note 1212, 558-9. This is true in the United States as well. See generally
Kozyris, No-fault insurance and the conflict of laws - An interim update, 1973 Duke L.J.
009.
181 The same would be true if the accident occurred in an American state. This is what
happened in Howells v. Wilson, supra note 162.
182 The suit would be brought there only if there was a possibility that the law of the
province would be interpreted as allowing recovery. For example, the Ontario guest
statute had been interpreted as not applying to a paying passenger, even though the
driver was not in the business of carrying passengers for compensation. Lemieux v.
Bedard [2953] o.R. 837. See the discussion in Hancock 205-6.
183 As regards the defence of contributory negligence, McLeod states, 'Where the defence
of contributory negligence is a complete bar to the plaintiff's action in the lex loci delicti,
the defendant's act will be justifiable according to the lex loci delicti in the absence of
penal sanction.' McLeod, supra note 112, 556. However, it would seem that ordinarily it
could be shown that the defendant's conduct was subject to 'penal sanction,' because it
was violative of the highway traffic regulations of that province.
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having a guest statute, and that province would apply its law allowing
recovery. However, if the Supreme Court of Canada were to abandon the
Phillips v. Eyre formula in favour of a policy-centred approach, then the
question arises as to how true conflicts would be dealt with in Canada.
Hancock's techniques of reconciliation could be quite suitable for the
resolution of true conflicts in Canada, especially since those techniques of
reconciliation would be formulated by the Supreme Court of Canada and
would be operative in the courts of each province.
In this regard, the structural differences between the legal systems of
Canada and the United States might well suggest a different resolution to
the true conflict in Canada than that which is favoured by Currie and
myself for the United States. Currie maintained that it was improper for
an American state court to sacrifice the real interests of that state in favour
of those of another state. 84 Experience indicates that, regardless of
whether it would be improper for an American state court to do this, the
courts are unwilling to do so and will generally apply their own law in the
true conflict situation.' 8 5 In the United States, the state courts are
considered an integral part of the government of the state and see
themselves as having the responsibility to implement state policy. They
are also supreme in the exposition of the law of each state, and the
Supreme Court of the United States is not properly concerned with
questions of state law. In Canada, by contrast, there is a unitary court
system, with the Supreme Court of Canada at its apex, and all the courts of
Canada are 'the Queen's courts." 8 6 So, the highest court of a Canadian
province would not likely see itself as having the same responsibility to
implement provincial policy as the highest court of an American state
would with respect to that state's policy. More importantly, all the
Canadian courts are subject to the binding authority of the Supreme
Court of Canada in all matters, including choice of law.
So, if the Supreme Court of Canada were to adopt a policy-centred
approach to choice of law, including techniques of reconciliation for the
true conflict, as advocated by Hancock, those techniques of reconciliation
could be applied by the courts throughout Canada. And it would not
seem at all anomalous in a case presenting a true conflict between Ontario
law and Quebec law for an Ontario court, applying the techniques of
reconciliation propounded by the Supreme Court of Canada, to say that
with respect to the matter in issue, the Quebec rule is 'better law.' My
point, then, is that because of the structural differences between the legal
systems of Canada and the United States, the techniques for the
184 Currie, supra note 6, 119-21, 182
185 Sedler, supra note 1o, 227-33
186 Valin v. Langlois [1879] 3 s.C.R. 1, 2o, aff'd., 5 App. Cas 115 (Ritchie c.j.)
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resolution of the true conflict advocated by Hancock may be more suitable
for and have greater efficacy in Canada than they would have in the
United States.
A final consideration relating to choice of law in Canada involves the
problem presented in Interprovincial Co-Operatives, Ltd v. The Queen in Right
of Manitoba,'8 7 with respect to the extraterritorial application of provincial
statutes. In that case, the Supreme Court of Canada, in a 4-3 decision,
held that the application of a Manitoba anti-pollution statute to activities
occurring in Ontario and Saskatchewan that had the effect of polluting
rivers in Manitoba was ultra vires the province. Pigeon j., in an opinion
joined in by Martland and SpencejJ., held that the province did not have
the authority under either section 92(13) or section 92(14) of the
Constitution Act, 1867, to create a cause of action for polluting waters in
Manitoba, on the basis of activity occurring in other provinces that was
lawful under the law of the provinces where the acts occurred.S88 In the
view of Pigeon j., only Parliament could regulate interprovincial pollu-
tion, either under its power over fisheries under section 91 (12) or under
the residual legislative power.' 89 He also said that the victims of pollution
in Manitoba could enforce any common law rights they may have had
against the out-of-province actors; by parity of reasoning, Ontario and
Saskatchewan lacked the power to immunize actors in those provinces
from common law liability for harm caused in another province.1 9o Laskin
c.j., joined by Judson and Spence jj., dissented, concluding that the
federal power over fisheries did not reach the protection of property
rights in fisheries within a province,' 9 and that the Manitoba statute as
applied here was not ultra vires as reaching 'property and civil rights
outside of the province." 9 2
The decisive fourth vote was provided by Ritchie j. He agreed with
Laskin c.j. on the issue of provincial versus federal authority. 93 But he
contended that a province did not have the constitutional authority to
apply its legislation extraterritorially to reach activity occurring in
another province. In arriving at this conclusion, he expressly related
conflict of laws principles to the scope of provincial legislative authority
under section 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867. He contended that the
scope of provincial legislative authority was limited by section 92 to the
territorial boundaries of the province, so that, 'in considering the law
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applicable in any particular case, the common law principles established
in the general field of conflict of laws must govern." 94 Applying the
second branch of the Phillips v. Eyre formula, he concluded that in this
case the acts of the defendants were justifiable under the laws of Ontario
and Saskatchewan, where they were done, so that they could form no basis
of a damage action.' 9 5 Thus, under the RoyalBank principle, 96 Manitoba
was applying its legislation extraterritorially to interfere with rights
created by the law of another province, which made such application ultra
vires.' 97 Laskin c.j., in contrast, contended that the Phillips v. Eyre
formula was inapplicable here because the cause of action arose in
Manitoba, where the harm occurred. 198 Likewise, Laskin saw the Royal
Bank principle being limited to provincial laws invalidating contractual
obligations valid in the province where they were made and having no
applicability to the authority of a province to apply its legislation to
extraprovincial activity causing harm within that province.' 99
A few years ago I had the occasion to discuss Interprovincial before a
combined Conflict of Laws-Constitutional Law class at Dalhousie Law
School. I began by considering what would happen if a similar case arose
before an American state court - for example, a New Hampshire
defendant acting under licence from that state polluted waters in New
Hampshire, which carried over into waters in Maine. As in Interprovincial,
I posited a Maine statute imposing liability, with suit brought against the
New Hampshire defendant in Maine. 2" I said that there was no question
194 Ibid. 521
195 Ibid. 521-4
196 RoyalBank of Canada v. The King [1913] A.C. 283. In that case, Alberta had guaranteed
the construction bonds of a railroad company, incorporated in that province, which
were sold in England. The bond proceeds were to be deposited in the Edmonton
branch of the Royal Bank to the credit of the Alberta provincial treasurer. On the
strength of the account, the branch made advances to the construction company, and
the construction company assigned to Royal Bank as a security its interest in the
proceeds of the bond issue. The Alberta legislature subsequently modified the prior
legislation and declared that the special account was to be made a part of the general
revenue of the province. The Privy Council held that the legislation was ultra vires the
province because it affected 'civil rights outside the province.' According to Hogg, the
holding in Royal Bank 'represented a very strict application of the extraterritorial
limitation.' Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada (2d ed. 1985) 270. See also the discussion
ofextraterritorial legislation in Hertz, The constitution and conflict oflaws: Approaches




20o I posited the situation where the defendant was also doing business in Maine. There is
currently some dispute in the United States whether it is constitutionally permissible
for a state to exercisejurisdiction under a long-arm act on the basis that the defendant's
activity in another state could foreseeably and in fact did cause harm in the forum. See
the discussion of this problem in Weintraub, Due process limitations on the personal
jurisdiction of state courts: Time for change (1984) 63 Ore. L.R. 485, at 512, 520-32.
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but that Maine would apply its own law allowing recovery, and that the
application of Maine law in this situation would be fully constitutional.
It may be noted that in Interprovincial there was no choice of law issue
before the Manitoba court. There was a legislative directive that the
statute apply to this case, which the forum court was bound to respect.
Assuming such a directive in our example, the Maine court would have to
follow it as well. 2°' Even in the absence of such a directive, however, Maine
would apply its own law. In terms of interest analysis, this case presents a
true conflict: Maine has a real interest in applying its own law to provide
compensation for harm occurring to the users of the water in Maine,
while New Hampshire has a real interest in protecting the New Hamp-
shire actor from liability.
There would be no possible constitutional objection to Maine applying
its own law in this case. First, as pointed out previously, American states
possess the general sovereign power, so it cannot be a constitutional
objection that they are applying their statutes extraterritorially to activity
occurring in another state but having an effect in that state. Second, in the
absence of direct conflict with federal legislation or federal pre-emption
(negative implication), state regulation is constitutional although the
matter being regulated also comes within the scope of federal power.2"2
Third, it would not matter that the defendants' actions were authorized
under New Hampshire law. Where two American states both have an
interest in applying their own law, one state is ordinarily not required by
the federal constitution to yield to the interest of another state. 0 3 Finally,
the defendants could not legitimately rely on New Hampshire law to
shield them from liability because it was foreseeable that their actions in
New Hampshire could have an adverse effect in Maine. Therefore,
201 See the discussion of legislative directives as to the applicability of a statute in Sedler,
Functionally restrictive substantive rules in American conflicts law (1976) 50 So. Cal.
L.R. 27, at 60-1.
202 See the discussion supra 98.
203 See, e.g. Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp. 348 U.S. 66 at 73 (1954); Pacific
Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission 3o6 U.S. 493, at 501-4 (1939).
See generally the discussion of full faith and credit as a limitation on choice of law in
Sedler, supra note 127, 92-1 oo. There is also no state sovereignty limitation that would
preclude a state from applying its law against a governmental entity of another state.
Thus, in Nevada v. Hall 440 U.s. 410 (1979), the United States Supreme Court held that
California could constitutionally apply its law in a tort action brought by California
residents who were injured there through the negligence of a Nevada state employee
who was driving a car in California on official business. Under California law there was
unlimited liability, but under Nevada law the waiver of sovereign immunity extended
only to suit in Nevada courts and liability was limited to $25,0oo. The Supreme Court
stated: 'To require California either to surrender jurisdiction or to limit respondents'
recovery to the $25,000 maximum of the Nevada statute would be obnoxious to its
statutorily based policies ofjurisdiction over non-resident motorists and full recovery.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require this result.' 440 U.S. 424.
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consistent with due process, they could be subject to Maine law with
regard to the consequences of those actions.
0 4
As the comparison between Interprovincial and this hypothetical case
indicates, the structural differences between the allocation of federal and
provincial-state power in Canada and the United States may have some
choice of law implications as well. As pointed out above, in the United
States there can be no constitutional objection to a state's applying its
legislation to activity occurring in another state that produced harmful
effects in the former state. Interprovincial indicates that there may be such
a constitutional objection in Canada - that is, that in Canada there may be
a constitutionally imposed territorial limitation of provincial legislative
authority. If this is so, then the legislation of one province may be
constitutionally inapplicable in a particular conflicts case, because the
application of the legislation in the particular case would be to give it
extraterritorial effect in another province.
Let me illustrate this problem by an example based on Moran v. Pyle
Nat. (Can.) Ltd.2 ° 5 There, a resident of Saskatchewan was fatally injured in
that province while removing a lightbulb manufactured by the defendant.
The defendant did not generally carry on business in Saskatchewan; all its
operations took place in Ontario, with components being manufactured
in Ontario or in the United States. The defendant sold all its products to
distributors, and some of them found their way to Saskatchewan. The
victims' survivors brought an action against the defendant in Saskatche-
wan, alleging negligent manufacture. The Supreme Court of Canada
upheld the plaintiffs' right to service exjuris, saying that there was a 'real
and substantial connection between the tort and Saskatchewan. '2 6 The
court also emphasized that it was foreseeable in this case that the product,
which was put in national channels of distribution, could be used in
Saskatchewan and cause injury there.
0 7
Let us suppose that in this case both Ontario and Saskatchewan had
enacted statutes specifically regulating the products liability of manufac-
turers. Let us also suppose that under the Ontario statute the manufac-
turer was liable only on the basis of negligence and that under the
Saskatchewan statute strict liability was imposed. Finally, let us suppose
204 Similar views were expressed by Laskin c.j. in lnterprovincial with respect to the
propriety of the application of the Manitoba legislation in that case. Interprovincial
498-501 (Laskin c.j., dissenting).
205 Supra note 164
20o6 Moran 4o8
207 Ibid. 409. The 1975 Amendments to the Ontario Rules of Practice, R. 25 (i)(h)
specifically authorize the exercise ofjurisdiction in Ontario, with service exjuris, where
the claim is 'in respect of damage sustained in Ontario arising from a tort, or breach of
contract committed elsewhere.'
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that the plaintiff cannot prove negligence and relies on the strict liability
provisions of the Saskatchewan statute. In terms of interest analysis, this
case, of course, presents the true conflict, with Saskatchewan having a real
interest in applying its law to enable the Saskatchewan victim to recover
and Ontario having a real interest in applying its law to protect the
Ontario manufacturer from liability.
Under the Phillips v. Eyre formula, the Saskatchewan court must deal
with the question of the place where the 'act was done' within the meaning
of the second branch of the formula. This question was not addressed by
Pigeon j. in Interprovincial, since he saw that case as presenting solely the
question of the extent of provincial legislative authority. 208 Laskin c.j., on
the other hand, said that Phillips v. Eyre was inapplicable in Interprovincial,
because the tort arose in Manitoba.'0 9 Ritchie j. took yet another
approach, saying that while the tort was interprovincial in nature and the
harm occurred in Manitoba, the question here was whether the acts done
in Saskatchewan and Ontario amounted to actionable torts at all.2" ' In our
example case, then, Laskin c.j. would say that Saskatchewan law applies
as the law of the forum, while Ritchie j. would say that the defendant was
not liable under the second branch of Phillips v. Eyre, because the
non-negligent manufacture of a defective product was not actionable
under Ontario law.
Now let us assume that the Supreme Court of Canada has abandoned
Phillips v. Eyre and adopted a policy-centred approach in its stead. Let us
also assume that this policy-centred approach includes the techniques of
reconciliation advocated by Hancock, and that the application of the
techniques of reconciliation in the example case would lead the court to
conclude that Saskatchewan law should be applied. But if the Saskatche-
wan statute is applied here, it is being applied extraterritorially to hold the
Ontario defendant liable for activity occurring in Ontario that was not
actionable under Ontario law. This result would be precluded by the
Pigeon and Ritchie opinions in Interprovincial. While the Pigeon
opinion would logically preclude the application of an Ontario statute to
bar common law remedies for harm occurring in Saskatchewan, this is not
important here, since the Ontario statute incorporates the common law
rule, and if the Saskatchewan statute is constitutionally inapplicable, the
plaintiff could not recover. Under the Laskin opinion in Interprovincial,
the Saskatchewan statute could be applied constitutionally.
2o8 Interprovincial 514-15 (opinion of Pigeon j.)
209 Ibid. 500-1 (opinion of Laskin c.j.)
210 Ibid. 521-5 (opinion of Ritchiej.)
211 The Pigeon opinion would seem to say that only Parliament could impose liability for
harm caused by products that were distributed in the national market.
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My point here is that the policy-centred approach to choice of law in the
United States has developed within the framework of a constitutional
system that imposes no limitations on the power of an American state to
apply its legislation extraterritorially to activity occurring in another state.
Indeed, so long as the application of a state's law" '2 to activity occurring in
another state is reasonable and not fundamentally unfair to the other
party, such application is constitutionally unobjectionable, even if the
injury did not occur in the former state. 1 3 Should Canada in the future
move in the direction of a policy-centred approach to choice of law, the
Supreme Court of Canada will have to confront the choice of law
implications of the extraterritorial application of provincial legislation
holding of Interprovincial. With due deference, as benefits any observa-
tions from an outside commentator, it seems to me that in regard to
matters falling within provincial authority generally" 4 there should be no
constitutional limitation on the extraterritorial application of provincial
legislation. Acts occurring in one province may have impact in another
province, and proper accommodation of the interests of all of the
provinces in the choice of law context can be achieved by the unifying
authority of the Supreme Court of Canada.
This lengthy review essay is intended as a tribute to Moffatt Hancock and
his illustrious career as a commentator on the conflict of laws. Perhaps it is
an indication of his tremendous influence on our thinking about conflicts
problems in the United States that I have used the occasion of this review
to venture some thoughts about the future development of conflicts law in
Canada and the valuable contribution that Professor Hancock's ideas
could make to that development.
212 Whether statutory or common law
213 Where a recovery state plaintiff is injured by a non-recovery state defendant in an
automobile accident in the defendant's home state, for example, and suit can be
maintained in the plaintiff's home state, that state may constitutionally apply its own
law allowing recovery. Because it has a real interest in doing so, the application of its law
is not 'arbitrary,' and because the defendant would not have relied on the law of the
recovery state in causing the accident, the application of the law of another state is not
'fundamentally unfair' to the defendant. See the discussion of this point in Sedler,
supra note 127, 72-3.
214 In lnterprovincial, only Pigeon, Martland, and Beetzjj. maintained that creating a cause
of action for the pollution of rivers in Manitoba was not within provincial legislative
authority.
